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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is a draft of Chapter 8 of a planned book, Preschool and Jobs: Human Development as 
Economic Development, and Vice Versa. This book analyzes early childhood programs’ effects on 
regional economic development. Four early childhood programs are considered: 1) universally accessible 
preschool for four-year-olds of similar quality to the Chicago Child Parent Center program; 2) the 
Abecedarian program, which provides disadvantaged children with high-quality child care and preschool 
from infancy to age five; 3) the Nurse Family Partnership, which provides low-income first-time mothers 
with nurse home visitors from the prenatal period until the child is age two; and 4) the Parent Child-Home 
program, which provides home visits and educational toys and books to disadvantaged families when the 
child is between the ages of 2 and 3.  
 
The book considers the main benefit of state economic development to be the resulting increase 
in earnings of the original residents who stay in that state. Early childhood programs increase residents’ 
earnings largely by increasing the quantity and quality of local labor supply. These programs will increase 
the employability and wages of former child participants in these programs. The book compares the 
effects on local earnings of early childhood programs with the effects of business incentives (e.g., 
property tax abatements). Business incentives increase local residents’ earnings by increasing the quantity 
and/or quality of local labor demand. 
 
This chapter considers the effects of early childhood programs and business incentives on the 
income distribution. A key issue is whether early childhood programs should be targeted on the poor, or 
made universally available for free. Relevant considerations in addressing this issue include how benefits 
of early childhood programs benefit with family income, and the political feasibility of targeted versus 
universal programs. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: J13, J24, I21, R23, R31, R30 
 
I thank Wei-Jang Huang, Claire Black, and Linda Richer for assistance with this book. I also 
thank the Pew Charitable Trusts for financial assistance for some of the research that led to this book. The 
findings and opinions of this book are those of the author, and should not be construed as reflecting 
official views of Pew or the Upjohn Institute. 
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How do early childhood programs affect the poor versus the middle class versus the rich? The 
answer to this question is important for several reasons.  
First, effects on different income groups may change these programs’ social benefits. In this 
discussion, I assume, without providing extensive justification, that programs that tilt benefits toward the 
poor are more socially desirable. Policymakers, policy analysts, and voters may favor such a tilt because 
of special concern for alleviating the problems of the poor. Alternatively, policymakers, policy analysts 
and voters may be concerned with making the income distribution more equal. A more equal income 
distribution may increase the number of people who can meet social standards for being a respectable 
member of society. Concern over the income distribution may be greater at present because over the last 
30 years the U.S. income distribution has become more unequal. To address concerns about the poor, we 
need information on whether early childhood programs significantly affect the incomes of the poor. To 
address concerns about the income distribution, we need information about how the effects on the poor 
compare with effects on other income groups.1  
Second, how early childhood programs affect various income groups may influence which 
income groups will provide these programs with political support. An income group is less likely to 
support a program as the program’s taxes increase relative to the program’s benefits. Assessing patterns 
of political support requires comparing the program’s benefits with taxes for different income groups. 
Adopting and sustaining a program requires political support that is sufficiently powerful. 
Third, how a program affects different income groups may influence program design. For early 
childhood programs, one important design issue is whether these programs should be targeted at children 
in lower income groups, or whether services should be universally available to all children. This is most 
prominently an issue for preschool programs. The targeting versus universal service debate is advanced 
by looking at specific numbers for how programs benefit different income groups under different designs. 
To frame this chapter’s discussion, I begin with arguments for targeting preschool services on the 
poor versus universalizing preschool.  I then consider the effects on different income groups of business 
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incentives. The effects of business incentives provide a baseline for considering the income distribution 
effects of early childhood programs.  I then go on to provide estimates of the income distribution effects 
of preschool programs under various assumptions about program design and program effects. Finally, I 
consider the income distribution effects of other early childhood programs. 
TARGETING PRESCHOOL VERSUS UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL 
Advocates for targeting preschool argue that policymakers should invest where returns are 
greatest. Targeting advocates perceive returns as being greatest for children from lower-income families.  
Nobel Prize–winning economist James Heckman makes the following argument:  
…I think the evidence is very strong that family background is a major predictor of future behavior of 
children. So a disproportionate number of problem kids come from disadvantaged families. The simple 
economics of intervention therefore suggests that society should focus its investment where it’s likely to 
have very high returns. Right now, that is the disadvantaged population....Functioning middle-class 
homes are producing healthy, productive kids … It is foolish to try to substitute for what the middle-class 
and upper-class parents are already doing.  (Heckman 2005) 
 
Advocates for universal services make two arguments. The first is that even if preschool’s 
benefits are greater for the poor, preschool may still have benefits for middle-class children that exceed its 
costs. Steven Barnett, co-director of the National Institute for Early Education Research, argues that: 
If the development of children in higher-income families is taken as an indicator of what is optimal, then 
it is clear that not only children in poverty, but children at the median income are entering school far less 
prepared to succeed than they should be. Children at the median income are as far behind their peers from 
families in the top income quintile as children in poverty are behind their peers from middle-income 
families. (Barnett 2006) 
 
Barnett admits that  
The weight of the evidence seems to indicate that effects [of preschool] are somewhat smaller for 
children who are not economically disadvantaged. However, these effects are not trivial and are 
proportionately large enough that long-term economic benefits [of preschool] for middle-income children 
could easily exceed costs. (Barnett 2006) 
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The second argument is that universal programs are more politically feasible and sustainable than 
programs targeted on the poor. This argument has been made with great force by Harvard sociologist 
Theda Skocpol:  
Rarely … do advocates of targeted benefits or specially tailored public support services face up to the 
problem of finding sustained political support for them … [I]t seems highly unlikely that further 
redistributive benefits or intensive services targeted on the poor alone can succeed politically. We still 
live amidst the backlash against the War on Poverty and the Great Society … Instead of policies for the 
disadvantaged alone, targeting within universalism is the prescription for effective and politically 
sustainable policies to fight poverty in the United States … When U.S. antipoverty efforts have featured 
policies targeted on the poor alone, they have not been politically sustainable, and they have stigmatized 
and demeaned the poor. (Skocpol 1991) 
 
By “targeting within universalism,” Skocpol means policies that provide disadvantaged groups with extra 
services within a program with universally accessibility.  
Targeted programs may lack the political support needed to be enacted or sustained. Even if the 
programs can be sustained, lack of political support may mean there is inadequate funding or political 
attention to maintain program quality. Steven Barnett restates the often used phrase: “The truth is that 
programs for the poor are too often poor programs.”  Barnett argues that preschool programs targeted at 
the poor too often do not follow the best program designs: 
The targeted programs provided to low-income children have never been closely modeled on those that 
produced the largest benefits. Preschool teachers in many targeted programs are required to have only a 
high school diploma. Even Head Start requires only half of its teachers to have a two-year college degree. 
Many state-funded preschool programs do not require college degrees. Looking at subsidized child care 
policy at both federal and state levels, there is little evidence of a commitment to anything more than 
warehousing young children. Preschool teachers are paid about half what public school teachers earn, and 
child care staff are even more poorly paid. (Barnett 2006) 
 
The counter argument is that universal programs are much more expensive. Providing expensive 
services to the affluent may be politically controversial. Heckman outlines the following argument that 
might be made against universal preschool education: 
Unfortunately, in discussions of early childhood interventions, people often bundle political issues with 
economic issues. Part of the appeal of universal early childhood intervention is that it provides universal 
day care, so some groups favor universal early childhood education because it effectively subsidizes 
women’s working. But bundling in this way also creates an opposition group saying, “Why should we 
subsidize affluent working women?” (Heckman 2005) 
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Robert Greenstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities argues that the right kind of 
targeted programs for the poor can get political support. In contrast, universal programs may oftentimes 
run into problems because of large costs. According to Greenstein: 
The evidence … indicates that factors other whether a program is universal or targeted have a significant 
bearing on the political prospects of social programs. Targeted programs, for example, are more likely to 
be strong politically when they serve low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the 
very poor. They are also more likely to succeed when they are regarded as providing an earned benefit or 
are otherwise linked to work, when they are entitlement programs with federal prescribed and funded 
benefits, when they seem effective, and when they are not provided in the form of cash welfare assistance 
for young, able-bodied people who do not work.  
Skocpol’s principal conclusion, that those seeking to develop new anti-poverty policies should rely 
almost exclusively on universal approaches, seems weak on another account as well: it conflicts with 
current fiscal constraints. Advocates of new universal programs need to acknowledge the political 
difficulties posed by the large costs of such programs, just as advocates of targeted programs need to 
acknowledge the political problems inherent in spending tax dollars on a narrow segment of the 
population. (Greenstein 1991) 
 
Whether targeted versus universal programs are the best way to deal with poverty is a fascinating 
philosophical debate. However, numbers can provide greater content to the argument. I now provide some 
actual numbers for the income distribution effects of different programs. I begin with business incentives 
before going on to various designs of universal preschool and other early childhood programs. 
BUSINESS INCENTIVES: WHO BENEFITS 
I begin by analyzing the income distribution effects of business incentives. This analysis serves as 
a baseline for analyzing the income distribution effects of early childhood programs. The analysis also 
introduces the concepts that will be used to analyze income distribution effects.  
Unlike the early childhood programs, business incentive programs as I have defined them have no 
natural scale. My models assume that business incentive programs have similar ratios of earnings effects 
to costs at different scales. In the simulations, I scale this permanent business incentive so that its cost, in 
present value terms, is the same as the modeled universal preschool program. As it happens, such a scale 
is roughly similar to what state and local governments typically spend on financial incentives to business 
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(as opposed to specialized business services).2 Therefore, the effects reported can be interpreted as the 
likely effects of a typical state’s financial incentives for business.  
To analyze distributional effects, I consider the effects on different quintiles of the household 
income distribution (Table 8.1). Quintiles are defined by ranking all households in the United States by 
household income. This ranking is then divided into five quintiles.  
The quintiles differ widely in their share of overall household income (row 1 of Table 8.1).3  If 
each household in the United States had the same income, then each quintile would have 20 percent of 
total U.S. income. Instead, the lowest income quintile has only 3.4 percent of total household income, 
which implies that the average household income of this quintile is about one-sixth of average household 
income for all U.S. households. In contrast, the highest income quintile has 49.7 percent of total 
household income. This implies that the average household income of this quintile is about two-and-a-
half times the average household income for all U.S. households. 
The simulations in this chapter report effects of a particular program on the present value of 
household earnings, or the present value of taxes. These figures are sometimes calculated as a percentage 
of the total present value of income for each household income quintile. This analysis thereby includes 
both immediate and long-term effects of each program on household income. All effects are included by 
discounting all future earnings, tax, and income flows at a 3 percent real discount rate.4    
For each quintile, I calculated the estimated dollar effects of business incentives on the present 
value of household earnings, relative to the average dollar effects for the lowest income quintile. These 
figures are derived by estimates I obtained in Bartik (1994) based on estimates of how metropolitan 
income distributions were affected by increases in employment growth.5   
The dollar effect of business incentives on earnings tends to be lower for lower income quintiles, 
and higher for higher income quintiles (row 2 of Table 8.1). For example, the dollar effects of business 
incentives on the present value of earnings for the middle income quintile are a little more than twice the 
dollar effect on the lowest income quintile. The dollar effect on the highest income quintile is about three 
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times the dollar effect on the lowest income quintile. Why is this the case? Business incentives increase 
earnings by increasing demand for labor. How much a given income group can respond to this labor 
demand increase is influenced by its involvement with the labor market and its skill level. Lower income 
groups have a lower percentage of their income in earnings. Furthermore, they earn lower hourly wages, 
so a given increase in hours of work has smaller dollar effects. Therefore, an increase in labor demand 
increases earnings by less in dollar terms for lower income groups.  
However, as a percentage of income, the effect of business incentives on earnings is much greater 
for lower income quintiles (row 3 of Table 8.1).  For example, the percentage effect of incentives on 
earnings for the lowest income quintile are about twice those of the middle income quintile. The 
percentage effect on earnings for the lowest income quintile is almost five times those for the highest 
income quintile. Even more modest dollar effects on earnings amount to larger percentage effects on 
income. One way to put it is that because lower income quintiles have more hours per year of 
unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force, there is more room for greater percentage effects 
on their incomes. 
The earnings effects as a percentage of income of this business incentive program must be 
compared to the program’s effects on taxes of each income group. From the previous analysis in Chapter 
3, we have estimates of the costs of a business incentive program relative to its effects on earnings. We 
need to determine how to allocate these costs across different income quintiles. I use estimates from the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy on the relative percentage burden of state and local taxes 
across income quintiles (McIntyre et al. 2003; Table 8.1, row 4).6 
These estimates are consistent with the consensus among public finance economists that state and 
local tax burdens are distributed in a modestly regressive fashion. That is, state and local tax burdens tend 
to be a somewhat higher percentage of income for lower income quintiles.  
From these estimates of percentage earnings benefits by quintile, and percentage tax costs by 
quintile, I construct two statistics to describe income distribution effects. These same two statistics will be 
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constructed for early childhood programs as well. First, I calculate the simple difference of percentage of 
income earnings benefits minus percentage of income tax costs. This is the net percentage effect on the 
present value of income of each income quintile due to the program. Second, I calculate the ratio of the 
present value of earnings effects of the program to the present value of its tax costs. This is the ratio for 
each quintile of what it pays for the program to what it gets—a type of benefit-cost ratio. 
Both these statistics might play a role in whether a given income quintile would support a 
program. The first statistic gives a “bottom line” for each program in terms of net effects on income. The 
second statistic reveals whether the program returns much in effects compared to what each income 
quintile invests in the program.  
For business incentives, the net percentage effects on each income quintile are positive (Table 
8.1, row 5).  Furthermore, the ratio of net earnings benefits to net costs is considerably greater than one 
for each quintile (Table 8.1, row 6).  Overall, each income quintile has good economic reasons to favor a 
high-quality business incentive program. 
Why do business incentives benefit all income quintiles? First, as discussed in detail in Chapters 
3 and 5, the high-quality business incentive program I model has overall benefits that substantially exceed 
costs, by a factor of over three to one. Second, as outlined above, the benefits of stronger local economic 
growth tend to be spread quite broadly. Higher income quintiles actually gain more in dollar terms from 
local economic growth, even though they gain less in percentage terms. At the same time, the regressivity 
of the tax burden from these programs is insufficient to offset the progressive effect that local economic 
growth has in increasing the incomes of lower income quintiles by a greater percentage.  
The income distribution effects of business incentive programs are modestly progressive.7  Net 
percentage effects of the program on the lowest income quintile are slightly over double those on the 
middle income quintile. Net percentage effects on the middle income quintile are about 4 times those on 
the highest income quintile. In terms of ratios, the ratio of earnings effects to costs is about 70 percent 
greater for the lowest income quintile than for the middle income quintile. The ratio of earnings benefits 
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to costs is about twice as great for the middle income quintile compared to the highest income quintile.  
However, the bottom line is that the net percentage effects of business incentives on the lowest 
income quintile are quite modest. The estimates suggest that a typical state’s financial business incentives 
only raise the income of the lowest income quintile by about one-and-a-half percent. These programs are 
not going to dramatically raise the well-being of the poor. 
The reasons for these modest effects are that the progressive income distribution effects and anti-
poverty effects of business incentives are limited by the problems that the lowest income groups have in 
the labor market. Expanding overall labor demand only addresses one of the problems that low income 
groups have in the labor markets. Given the more limited involvement of lower income groups in the 
labor market, and given their lower wages, there are limits to how much expanded overall labor demand 
can do to help the poor.  
More progressive distributional effects might be achieved by business incentives that targeted 
more of the labor demand increases on lower income groups. For example, this might occur due to 
business incentive programs that successfully get assisted businesses to focus a greater share of their 
hiring on the local unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 5, greater hiring of the local unemployed can be 
encouraged through First-Source programs coupled with customized job training. Business incentives 
may also be provided for hiring the local unemployed, such as in Minnesota’s MEED program. 
Business incentives could be made more progressive. However, the progressivity of boosts to 
labor demand are limited by how much such programs can change the job skills of the disadvantaged. 
Customized job training programs can increase job skills. Getting more job experience through greater 
labor demand can increase job skills. However, there is common sense to the notion that larger changes in 
skills may require human capital programs that directly focus on skills development.  Adding on human 
capital components to business incentives may have more limited effects on job skills.    
Greater help for the labor market problems of the poor requires greater changes in their skills. 
This is probably most appropriately addressed through human capital programs. Early childhood 
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programs are human capital programs that try to intervene early, when skills are thought to be the most 
malleable.   
Preschool: Speculation About Possible Distributional Benefits 
The challenge in assessing the distributional effects of preschool is that there is no direct 
evidence. The best studies, such as those of Perry Preschool and the Chicago Child Parent Centers, focus 
on long-run effects on children from disadvantaged families. No studies rigorously examine long-run 
effects of high-quality preschool on children from middle-class and upper-class families. For example, 
although Heckman believes the returns from preschool is lower for middle-class families than the poor, he 
admits that this belief is not proven by empirical evidence: “Now you say, Do I have really hard evidence 
on this? The answer is no” (Heckman 2005). 
We can speculate about possible patterns of preschool effects across different income groups. On 
the one hand, children in more disadvantaged groups are further from “optimal patterns” of child 
development. This might make it easier to improve the development path for these children. On the other 
hand, as Barnett argues, middle-class children also lag behind children from upper-class families. He 
maintains that there might be considerable benefits for middle class children. 
With respect to later outcomes, children from disadvantaged families will have greater baseline 
high school dropout rates. Therefore, it might be easier to improve high school graduation rates for 
disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, children from more advantaged groups might be closer to 
attaining a college degree. It might be easier for preschool to positively affect college graduation rates for 
advantaged groups. 
In this context, it is relevant that the dollar return from attaining a college degree is greater than 
the dollar return from attaining a high school degree. The annual earnings boost from attaining a four-year 
college degree, versus only a high school degree, is $19,400 (2005 dollars), increasing annual earnings 
from $31,500 to $50,900. The annual earnings boost from attaining a high school degree but no higher 
degree, versus being a high school dropout, is $8,100, increasing earnings from $23,400 to $31,500. 
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(Baum and Ma 2007).  A much smaller increase in college degree attainment is needed to provide the 
same earnings increase as an increase in high school degree attainment.  
Another way to describe the contending influences is as follows. Disadvantaged groups have 
lower baseline wages and employment rates than more advantaged groups. On the one hand, this provides 
more potential for increasing earnings through boosting wages and employment rates. On the other hand, 
a given boost in employment rates or wage rates will increase earnings by more in dollar terms for groups 
with higher baseline rates.      
The best direct evidence on distributional effects of universal preschool is from studies of 
Oklahoma’s universal preschool program (Gormley et al. 2005). This evidence is only for short-run 
effects. The Gormley et al. study compares test score results for children who are just below or just above 
the age cutoff for Oklahoma’s preschool program. The treatment group is children who barely made the 
age cutoff for attending preschool the previous year, who actually did attend the state preschool program, 
and who are now beginning kindergarten. The comparison group is children who barely missed the age 
cutoff for attending preschool the previous year, and who are now beginning the state preschool program. 
Both groups are administered the same test at the same time. The groups are similar in age and other 
characteristics. The groups differ mainly in that the treatment group attended the state’s preschool the 
previous year, while the comparison group did not attend the state’s preschool program. However, the 
comparison group may have attended private preschool programs. Gormley et al. find that although test 
score results improve with age, there is an abrupt jump in test score results at the age cutoff. This abrupt 
jump is most likely associated with having attended the state’s preschool program.8 
Gormley and his colleagues find evidence that preschool has short-run positive effects on test 
scores for children from all income groups.  As is common in educational research, the only information 
on income status of children is whether they are eligible for a free lunch under federal rules (family 
income less than 130 percent of the poverty line) or a reduced-price lunch (family income between 130 
percent and 185 percent of the poverty line), or whether they must pay full price for lunch (family income 
 11
above 185 percent of the poverty line). Test score effects for the highest income group are quite similar to 
test score effects for the lowest income group.  Test score effects for the middle income group are 
somewhat higher than test score effects for either the higher income or lower income groups.9  
Gormley et al.’s results weaken the case that preschool will have smaller effects on more 
advantaged children.  Preschool is about as effective in increasing the test scores of higher income groups 
as it is for lower income groups.    
BASELINE RESULTS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL 
For the baseline results, I use distributional assumptions from Karoly and Bigelow (2005). Their 
results assume that lower-income children are more likely to enroll in universal preschool than upper-
income children. In addition, lower-income children are assumed to be less likely than upper-income 
children to be enrolled in high-quality preschool in the absence of a high-quality universal program. 
Finally, for any particular change in preschool enrollment brought about by universal preschool, the dollar 
benefits are assumed to be more for lower-income children than upper-income children. For example, 
consider children who without universal preschool would not have been in any preschool program. 
Karoly and Bigelow assume that in this group of children, benefits for upper-income children are one-
fourth the benefits for lower-income children.10 
I simulate the distributional effects of universal preschool under these assumptions (Table 8.2). 
One part of the simulation calculates the dollar effect of preschool on the average participant in each 
income quintile relative to the lowest income quintile (row 2, Table 8.2). These dollar effects are based on 
Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions. (Appendix 8A details how these effects are derived from Karoly and 
Bigelow’s assumptions.) These distributional effects across quintiles assume a quite rapid fall-off in 
dollar effects from the lowest income quintiles to middle income and higher income quintiles. For 
example, the dollar effects on the middle income quintile are less than a third of the dollar effects on the 
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lowest income quintile. Dollar effects on the two highest income quintiles are less than one-tenth of the 
dollar effects on the lowest income quintile.11  
This fall-off in distributional effects is qualitatively consistent with the opinions of other 
preschool experts. Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions imply a somewhat larger quantitative fall-off in per 
child benefits with family income than is assumed by some other researchers. For example, Steve Barnett, 
the co-director of the National Institute for Early Education Research, assumed that effects for children in 
the middle three quintiles would be one-half those of children in the lowest income quintile, while effects 
for the top quintile would be zero (Barnett 2004). He regards these as “realistic assumptions about 
program participation and extrapolated benefits.” Heckman has not made specific assumptions about how 
preschool’s returns decline for higher-income children. However, his remarks imply that returns are 
smaller for middle- and upper-income children, not nonexistent.     
Under these distributional assumptions, universal preschool’s benefits are distributed highly 
progressively. The return per dollar of tax cost is about 25 to 1 for the lowest income quintile (row 6, 
Table 8.2). This is almost nine times the return per dollar of tax cost for the middle income quintile. 
Furthermore, the return per dollar of tax cost is about nine times as great for the middle income quintile as 
it is for the highest income quintile.12 
Preschool provides large benefits for the lowest income quintile. The net present value of 
earnings benefits, even allowing for the regressive nature of state and local taxes, are almost 7 percent of 
income for the lowest income quintile.13 This large effect is not surprising. The estimates for the lowest 
income quintile are based on studies of the Chicago Child Parent Center program. This program gained 
fame because it was so effective.14   
On the other hand, under these distributional assumptions, preschool’s benefits are distributed 
quite broadly. There are net positive benefits for the bottom three income quintiles, and thus net positive 
benefits for over half the population. The net benefits for the middle income quintile are a little less than 
one-half of 1 percent of income.  Even the two upper income quintiles get some nonnegligible benefits. 
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The highest income quintile gets 32 cents in benefits for every dollar invested. The next highest income 
quintile gets 59 cents in benefits for every dollar invested. These benefits occur partially due to the broad 
labor demand benefits of simply spending more money. But they also occur because preschool’s benefits 
are so large for the disadvantaged, that even benefits for upper income quintiles that are drastically scaled 
back have some importance.  
But universal preschool’s benefits are more progressive, and hence less broad, compared to 
business incentives. For example, consider a universal preschool program and a business incentives 
program of the same cost. For the lowest income quintile, the net benefits of the preschool program are 
almost five times the net benefits of the business incentive program (Table 8.2, row 5 vs. row 7). Yet the 
business incentive program overall has higher net benefits and returns. The upper three quintiles clearly 
gain much more from business incentives than from universal preschool. 
Universal preschool’s benefits are more progressive compared to business incentives because of 
how dollar benefits vary across income quintiles. As discussed above, the research literature suggests that 
increases in labor demand yield considerably higher dollar benefits on higher income quintiles. On the 
other hand, everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits of universal preschool are highest in the lowest 
income quintile.  
ADDING IN POSSIBLE CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS 
As discussed in Chapter 7, universal preschool programs may lead to some property value 
increases. Property buyers and sellers may recognize the benefits of preschool in increasing the earnings 
of former child participants and their parents. If they do so, property value increases will “capitalize” 
some of the benefits of universal preschool. Benefits will be transferred from workers to property owners. 
This capitalization is likely to make the returns to preschool more regressive.  
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The extent of capitalization depends upon whether property buyers and sellers recognize the 
future earnings benefits of preschool. Capitalization also depends upon what discount rates are used by 
property buyers and sellers to value these future earnings benefits. I will assume here the maximum 
possible capitalization that has some empirical support, as discussed in Chapter 7. Specifically, I will 
assume that property buyers and sellers take full account of future earnings effects. I assume the taxes 
associated with these programs are ignored by property buyers and sellers. I assume property buyers and 
sellers use a real discount rate of 4.7 percent in considering how the earnings benefits from universal 
preschool should affect property valuations. These assumptions yield a relatively large amount of 
capitalization. Other plausible assumptions about how property buyers and sellers behave would yield 
lower degrees of capitalization. Based on these assumptions, I calculate that universal preschool will 
increase property values by 6.4 percent. How this particular property value increase is derived is 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
I simulate the distributional effects of universal preschool under this capitalization assumption 
(Table 8.3). A considerable percentage of the total earnings benefits of preschool are capitalized into 
higher values. I estimate that preschool leads to property value increases that are about half the present 
value of earnings benefits.15    
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of this capitalization are distributed in a manner that makes 
distributional effects less progressive. For example, the lowest income quintile has a much higher 
percentage loss (about four times as great) from higher consumer housing prices than is true for the 
highest income quintile (0.753 percent vs. 0.196 percent; row 3 of Table 8.3).  But the highest income 
quintile has a somewhat higher percentage gain from higher property values than the lowest income 
quintile (0.289 percent vs. 0.239 percent, about 20 percent greater; row 4 of Table 8.3).  
Higher consumer housing prices have larger costs for lower income quintiles because housing 
expenditures are a greater percentage of income for lower income quintiles. Higher property values 
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provide greater benefits for the highest income quintile because the highest income quintile owns more 
property relative to its income.  
Therefore, on net, capitalization makes the distribution of the benefits from universal preschool 
less progressive. The lower income quintiles gain less, and the highest income quintile gains more. 
However, the earnings benefits from universal preschool are so great for the lower income 
quintiles that their net benefits from universal preschool are still quite high. For example, for the lowest 
income quintile, capitalization only lowers the ratio of net after tax benefits to costs from about 25 to 
about 23. (Compare rows 8 and 10 in Table 8.3.)  This is still a very progressive program. 
Capitalization does significantly increase the payoff from universal preschool to the highest 
income quintile. The highest income quintile now receives 78¢ in benefits for every tax dollar invested. 
This is over double the 32¢ if there is no capitalization (Row 8 and row 10, Table 8.3).  
It is apparent from these calculations that even complete capitalization would not eliminate the overall 
progressivity of universal preschool. Even if the overall benefits of preschool are fully capitalized into 
higher property values, this does not mean that these benefits are completely capitalized for each income 
group. We can think of blowing up capitalization benefits so they were the same as the overall earnings 
benefits. Under this assumption, the lowest income quintile still gains so much from the higher earnings 
benefits that the capitalization effects cannot completely offset these effects. Because all income groups 
participate in the same housing market, capitalization effects can not perfectly offset earnings benefits for 
each income group, even if they do so overall.16 
ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The baseline distributional assumptions for universal preschool seem reasonable. As Karoly and 
Bigelow said, these distributional assumptions “can arguably be viewed as quite conservative.” Given 
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current evidence, the most reasonable assumption is that preschool benefits significantly decline as we go 
from disadvantaged families to middle income families, but not to zero.  
However, because of the lack of evidence on long-term distributional effects of universal 
preschool, it seems prudent to consider alternative distributional assumptions. I consider two sets of 
alternative assumptions. One set is that the dollar benefits for the children of all income groups are the 
same as the dollar benefits for the disadvantaged. This set of assumptions broadens benefits. Given that 
everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits actually decline with increasing family income, this set of 
assumptions captures one bound that contains the possible assumptions. The other set of assumptions 
assumes that benefits are zero for the children of non-disadvantaged income groups. Given that there 
should be some benefits of preschool for middle-class children, this second set of assumptions captures 
another bound that contains the possible assumptions.  
I did simulations that compared the distributional effects of universal preschool under three sets 
of assumptions: the baseline assumptions, and these two sets of extreme bound assumptions (Table 8.4).  I 
focused on comparing three types of effects for each income quintile: 1) the dollar benefits of preschool 
relative to the lowest income group, 2) the present value of the net after-tax benefits of universal 
preschool as a percentage of income, and 3) the ratio of the present value of earnings benefits to the 
present value of tax costs.  
Despite the extremity of the assumptions, the results have some elements in common. First, under 
all these assumptions, overall net benefits are positive. Second, under all these assumptions, the 
distribution of the benefits of universal preschool are highly progressive.  
Overall net benefits are positive in all three cases because the benefits of universal preschool for 
the disadvantaged group alone are greater than the overall costs of universal preschool. Extra benefits for 
non-disadvantaged groups are icing on the cake. Furthermore, benefits are always distributed 
progressively because the most regressive assumption is that different income groups have the same 
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dollar benefit from preschool. Even with this extreme assumption of equal dollar benefits, the percentage 
benefits from preschool will be much greater for lower income quintiles.  
Of course, there also are some large differences in results. As one would expect, universal 
preschool’s overall benefits are much greater when we assume that preschool’s large dollar benefits for 
the disadvantaged broadly extend to all income groups. Overall net benefits more than triple. (Overall net 
benefits increase from 0.396 percent of income under the baseline assumptions to 1.370 percent under the 
equal dollar benefits for all groups assumptions. See rows 3 and 6, Table 8.4).  This broadening of 
benefits means that all income groups have net benefits from universal preschool, not just the first three 
quintiles (row 3 and row 6). In contrast, universal preschool’s benefits are much lower when benefits are 
restricted to the disadvantaged. Overall net benefits of universal preschool are cut in half when only the 
disadvantaged benefit. (Overall net benefits decrease from 0.396 percent under the baseline assumptions 
to 0.203 percent. See rows 3 and 9, Table 8.4.) The program redistributes income from the upper three 
quintiles to the bottom two quintiles. If only the disadvantaged get earnings benefits from the program, 
the upper three quintiles all lose about one-fifth of 1 percent in income from the increased taxes to pay for 
the universal preschool program (row 9, Table 8.4).   
TARGETED VS. UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL 
Given the distributional possibilities, should preschool be targeted on the disadvantaged rather 
than be universally accessible? 
I consider the implications of targeting preschool on Karoly and Bigelow’s disadvantaged group 
(Table 8.5). That group is the lower 35 percent of the household income distribution. Targeting 
considerably lowers preschool costs. The total costs of this targeted preschool program are only 26 
percent of the costs of a universal preschool program. Costs are 26 percent of a universal program 
 18
because of lower enrollment. Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions imply that only 26 percent of enrollment 
in a universal preschool program will be in this disadvantaged group.17    
These lower program costs reduce the tax cost of preschool for all income groups.  To calculate 
these costs, I scale back the costs of universal preschool for each income group by 74 percent. 
Targeting also means that benefits will be the same under all three sets of distributional 
assumptions. As discussed above, the different sets of distributional assumptions differ in the dollar 
benefits for non-disadvantaged groups relative to disadvantaged groups. If services are only targeted on 
children from the disadvantaged group, then these distributional assumptions are irrelevant in determining 
gross or net benefits. 
I calculated net benefits, and the ratio of benefits to tax costs, for each income group from a 
targeted preschool program. This targeted program has a very high overall ratio of benefits to costs—
more than seven (row 5 of Table 8.5). Targeting services to a disadvantaged group that is estimated, based 
on several good studies, to have high returns to preschool obviously will result in a program that has high 
overall returns. 
The returns to the bottom two quintiles are particularly high. These two quintiles receive much 
the same benefits from services as under a universal program. Benefits go down a little bit because of 
lower economic development benefits from preschool spending. But this lowering of benefits is slight. 
However, the targeting lowers tax costs by 74 percent.  The ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs for the 
two bottom quintiles more than triples (Table 8.5, row 5 vs. row 7). However, this corresponds to only 
increasing the net benefits to these two groups by about one-tenth to one-fifth of 1 percent of income (row 
4 vs. row 6, Table 8.5). 
On the other hand, the targeting means there is no possibility of substantial economic 
development benefits for the upper three quintiles. (There are no child benefits at all in these groups; there 
are some assumed benefits from the spending.) On the other hand, the targeting holds down the tax 
burden from preschool. Under a preschool program that is strictly limited to households in the lower third 
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of the household income distribution, the top three quintiles all suffer net losses from paying taxes to 
support the targeted program. 
It should again be noted that this analysis focuses on economic development benefits. An analysis 
that also considers the benefits of reduced crime would probably come up with larger benefits overall, and 
some additional benefits for the upper three quintiles. 
Given these data, which is better, targeted or universal preschool? I will consider two 
perspectives. The first is that of some objective policymaker or policy analyst. This policy wonk is trying 
to choose the policy that maximizes some weighted sum of overall efficiency benefits plus benefits from 
making the income distribution more progressive. The other perspective is that of a political operative. 
Which program will be easier to get enacted, and sustain and grow over time at a high-quality level? 
From the first perspective, the targeted vs. universal preschool issue depends upon which world 
we live in. Do we live in a world in which preschool only benefits the disadvantaged? Or do we live in a 
world in which preschool has at least some significant benefits for the disadvantaged? 
If we live in a world in which preschool only benefits the disadvantaged, then a targeted 
preschool program is the better policy. In that world, the net overall benefits from a targeted program are 
almost twice those of a universal program (0.352 percent vs. 0.203 percent, from row 4 vs. row 12, Table 
8.5). All income groups will be better off with a targeted preschool program than with a universal 
program (row 4 vs. row 12). 
At the other extreme, if we live in a world in which preschool’s dollar benefits do not decline 
with family income, then a universal program is the better policy. In that world, the universal program’s 
overall net benefits are almost four times as great as those of the targeted program (row 10 vs. row 4, 
Table 8.5). Both the targeted and the universal program have the same “bang for the buck,” delivering 
over $7 in benefits for every dollar of costs (row 5 vs. row 11). But the universal program operates at 
almost a four times greater scale. Four out of the five income groups gain more from the universal 
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program than the targeted program, and the benefits for the lowest income group are almost the same in 
either program.  
But these are the extreme cases. More interesting is the set of baseline distributional assumptions. 
What if we live in a world, as we probably do, in which preschool’s benefits do decline significantly with 
income, but there are still considerable benefits for middle-income families? In that case, I think the 
objective policymaker would probably favor universal preschool over targeted preschool. Targeted 
preschool does have a higher “bang for the buck” than universal preschool. Targeted preschool has 
overall benefits of over $7 for every dollar of cost. These benefits are over twice as great per dollar of 
cost as those of universal preschool, at less than $3 per dollar of cost (row 5 vs. row 7). However, net 
overall benefits of universal preschool are about 10 percent greater (0.396 percent of overall income vs. 
0.352 percent, from the last column of row 8 vs. row 4). And under universal preschool, the second 
lowest and middle income quintiles do better than under targeted preschool. The lowest income quintile’s 
net benefits are almost unchanged. And the two highest income quintiles do somewhat worse under 
universal preschool. Therefore, universal preschool would seem to be preferable on efficiency grounds to 
targeted preschool, as net benefits are higher. And universal preschool would seem preferable on 
distributional grounds to targeted preschool, as it redistributes more income from the highest income 
quintiles to the low and middle income quintiles.   
From a policy wonk’s perspective, there are net efficiency and distributional benefits to choosing 
universal preschool over targeted preschool. Returns to preschool are lower as we extend services to 
higher-income families. However, these returns are high enough that the gains for lower middle and 
middle income quintiles outweigh the losses to the highest income quintiles. Cutting off preschool service 
to middle-class families doesn’t make sense. The benefits of such services to middle-class families 
outweigh the costs. The benefit-cost ratio is not as high as it is for lower-income families, but it still 
exceeds one. 
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But the practical political perspective is just as important. What conditions will make a program 
easier to enact and sustain? From a political perspective, what is important is what people perceive to be 
the benefits of universal preschool. Perceived benefits may differ from actual benefits. 
From a political perspective, expanded preschool is more feasible and sustainable if it is 
perceived as having broader benefits for the middle class and the proposal is for a broad program. In that 
case, the universal program will probably benefit a majority of the population. A targeted program, in 
contrast, relies for its support on some altruism from a majority of the population.  
This political case for universal preschool over targeted preschool is strengthened if the public 
and political actors believe universal preschool may be capitalized into higher property values. 
Capitalization creates larger benefits of preschool for the politically powerful upper income quintile. The 
ratio of benefits to tax costs for this quintile more than doubles (row 9 vs. row 7). Targeted preschool, 
with its narrower eligibility, seems less likely to lead to capitalization. With capitalization, the net losses 
from the upper income quintile due to adoption of a preschool program are slightly lower for a universal 
program than for a targeted program (row 8 vs. row 4). 
Three other factors may increase the policy wonk and political case for universal preschool over 
targeted preschool: administrative costs and stigma costs of targeting, and reduced peer effects due to 
targeting. My simulations of strict targeting assume that administrative costs are unchanged due to 
administering some income-conditional preschool program. I assume these costs are slight because all the 
program has to do is accept or reject some participant. However, if these costs prove to be significant, 
they would lower net benefits of the targeted program, which would hurt the case for the targeting.  
Targeting may also impose stigma costs on participation. The preschool program is now 
identified as a program that serves the disadvantaged.  Some disadvantaged parents may choose not to 
participate in a targeted program but would participate in a universal program. If this occurs on a large 
scale, then the benefits of targeted preschool may be significantly reduced.  
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Finally, targeting vs. universal programs may affect peer effects. The work of Henry and 
Rickman (2007) provides evidence of significant peer effects in preschool.  Targeting, compared to 
universal programs, means that the public preschool program will have less middle- and upper-class 
participation with lower-class students. This may reduce positive peer effects on disadvantaged students. 
On the other hand, this greater income integration may have negative peer effects on middle- and upper-
class students. It is often assumed in discussions of income integration in K–12 education that peer effects 
are asymmetric by income group (e.g., Kahlenberg 2001). It is assumed that the positive effects on the 
lower-income students from the presence of middle-class and upper-income students will exceed the 
negative effects on the middle- and upper-income students. The rationale for this asymmetry is that 
academic achievement of lower-income students may be more sensitive to school culture. If this 
asymmetry is true, then reducing income integration will lower the overall effectiveness of early 
childhood experiences in preparing children for future success. Even if this asymmetry of peer effects is 
untrue, peer effects mean that the reduction of income integration in a targeted program will hurt the 
academic achievement of lower-income students.   
For all these reasons, if universal preschool has some significant actual and perceived benefits for 
middle-class students, then I think a universal program is preferable to targeting preschool on the 
disadvantaged. A program with broader middle-class benefits makes more economic and political sense. 
If such benefits are at all plausible in public debate, universal preschool is the way to go.  
But what if the vision of broad benefits for preschool does not win out in the political 
marketplace of ideas? For example, what if the “research consensus” moves toward finding that these 
programs only benefit the disadvantaged? In that case, a targeted preschool program is a reasonable fall-
back position. Such a targeted program would deliver significant benefits to low income groups. (For 
example, the net benefits for the lowest income quintile are almost 7 percent of income.) And the tax 
costs for the middle and upper income quintiles are modest. The net losses for these three upper income 
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quintiles are only about 1/20th of 1 percent of income. If the public does not believe that universal 
preschool has broad benefits, this is all the public may be willing to pay for.   
TARGETING WITHIN UNIVERSALISM: UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL WITH INCOME-
GRADUATED FEES 
What about a more moderate targeting effort that maintains universal accessibility? Specifically, I 
did simulations that considered the possible effects of running a universal program with some fees for 
children from upper-income families.  
To try to preserve middle-class benefits, these fees are only imposed on families in the upper 40 
percent of the income distribution (greater than $62,000 in household income.) In the baseline set of 
assumptions, this upper 40 percent of households was the group with the lowest benefits from preschool. 
In contrast, the lower three quintiles all had significant benefits from preschool. Therefore, restricting fees 
to the upper 40 percent seems more likely to increase efficiency than a broader fee structure. Imposing 
fees on the bottom three quintiles might discourage usage from the bottom three quintiles with the highest 
benefits. Furthermore, it seems politically wise to only impose fees on a minority of the population. This 
is consistent with the political advice given previously above, by Robert Greenstein, executive director of 
the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, that “[t]argeted programs … are more likely to be strong 
politically when they serve low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the very poor.” 
The fees I considered were half of preschool costs for upper-income families. This ends up being 
a fee of $4.52 per hour.18  This seems roughly consistent with what upper-income families might be 
willing to consider paying. Data suggest that families in such income brackets average paying $3.90 per 
hour for all types of paid child care.19 Paying a little more for high-quality preschool seems feasible. 
Charging fees to upper-income families should reduce their demand for the preschool program. I 
used estimates from a previous study by Blau and Hagy (1998) of how overall demand for all types of 
child care responds to changes in hourly fees. However, we would assume that the change in usage of one 
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type of child care, a public preschool, in response to a fee would be larger than the change in usage of all 
types of child care in response to fees. Other types of child care and preschool are substitutes for the 
public preschool program. The availability of these substitutes will increase the demand response. 
Households can more readily reduce demand for any good or service if there are adequate substitutes for 
that good or service.  Therefore, I assumed that the change in public preschool demand due to the fee 
would be twice the overall child care demand response estimated by Blau and Hagy. 
With this assumption about the demand respond to fees, usage of preschool among households 
with incomes greater than $62,000 (the top 40 percent) is reduced by 25 percent. This demand response 
seems plausible.  Overall usage (and costs) of preschool is reduced by 12 percent. Fee revenue comprises 
21 percent of the overall costs of the program. Fees do have significant effects on the size and financing 
of the program.    
A targeted program that charges fees should have some extra administrative costs. The program 
will have to determine household income and the appropriate fees, and collect those fees.  I assumed that 
these extra administrative costs from fees amount to about 5 percent of program costs.20 
What are the effects of charging income-based fees in a universal preschool program? I do 
simulations using the baseline distributional assumptions. (Table 8.6.  Appendix 8B explores other 
distributional assumptions.) The simulations suggest that the addition of these fees has little effect on the 
overall net benefits of the program (row 7 vs. row 11; 0.397 percent net benefit vs. 0.396 percent). The 
fees do promote economic efficiency to some extent by cutting back usage from upper income quintiles 
whose benefits from the program are low. On the other hand, charging fees does add administrative costs 
to the preschool program. Furthermore, the new program does reduce economic development benefits 
somewhat. This occurs for some of the upper-income families that now forego preschool. It also occurs 
for all income quintiles due to the reduced spending and size of the program. On net, all these factors turn 
out to be a wash.  
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However, adding fees does have some important redistributive effects. First, charging fees 
redistributes some income from the two upper income quintiles to the three bottom income quintiles. This 
redistribution is relatively modest. The net losses for the two top income quintiles, and the net gains for 
the three bottom income quintiles, are all less than 0.1 percent of income (row 7 vs. row 11). This 
redistribution takes place for two reasons. The reduced demand for preschool from upper-income families 
reduces benefits for preschool for the upper two income quintiles, and reduces costs for preschool 
services for the three lower income quintiles. The fees paid by the upper-income families also reduce net 
benefits for the top two income quintiles, and reduce the taxes that the three lower income quintiles pay to 
finance the program.  
Second, charging fees redistributes how program cost is financed in the upper two income 
quintiles. Some program cost is shifted from upper income households that do not use this preschool 
program to families that do. For upper-income households that do not use preschool, what is relevant is 
the change in their tax costs of the program. This tax cost is reduced by a little more than one-quarter for 
these upper two income quintiles (row 3 vs. row 10). Although this is large as a percentage of the tax 
burden of the program, it is modest in relation to income, again less than 0.1 percent of income. For 
upper-income households that use preschool, they now are charged a fee for the program. However, they 
still presumably are better off having the program than no program, or else they would not have chosen to 
enroll their child and pay the fee. In addition, I note that the estimates suggest that the earnings benefits 
for upper income families who use the program exceed the fees.21     
Does charging income-based fees improve universal preschool? From a policy wonk’s 
perspective, the fee-based program might be slightly preferable. The fee-based program does not affect 
the overall net benefits of the program. However, the modest redistribution from the upper two quintiles 
to the bottom three quintiles would be desirable.  
From a political practicality perspective, it is unclear whether charging fees makes universal 
preschool easier to enact and sustain. The political attractiveness of fees depends on the political influence 
 26
of upper-class households who don’t use preschool vs. those who do. The upper-class “non-users” may be 
more supportive of a universal preschool program that holds down costs by charging fees. They may be 
less supportive of a free universal program that can be framed as subsidizing “affluent working women” 
(Heckman 2005).  On the other hand, the upper-class users of preschool may resent paying these income-
based fees while other families receive free services. This may reduce this group’s support for universal 
preschool. Whether fees make sense from a political perspective depends on how fees and their rationale 
are perceived by both preschool users and nonusers in the upper-class community. 
THE ABECEDARIAN PROGRAM: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF A LARGE SCALE 
TARGETED PROGRAM 
As described in Chapter 4 and its references, the Abecedarian program is an intense and costly 
intervention targeted at children from disadvantaged families. The program provides full-time, full-year, 
and high-quality child care and preschool from birth to age 5. The program potentially provides over 
12,000 hours of service to each child. Because of the program’s intensity, the Abecedarian program is 
very expensive per child. The present value of services for each child exceeds $60,000. Of course, in 
return for those intense services, the program produces large economic development benefits. As outlined 
in Chapter 4, of the various early childhood programs considered here, the Abecedarian program yields 
the largest economic development benefits per child participant. This is partly due to the large effects on 
future earnings of former child participants. But it also is due to the much larger effects on the labor 
supply of parents of five years of free child care, compared to the more limited intervention of other early 
childhood programs, such as one year of part-time, school-year preschool. 
To analyze the income distributional effects of the Abecedarian program, I assume that services 
would be restricted to the bottom quintile of the population. As outlined in Chapter 4, Ludwig and 
Sawhill (2007) estimate that a full-scale Abecedarian program could achieve similar results to the original 
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model by targeting families below the poverty line. This would involve providing services to families in 
the lowest 15 percent of the family income distribution. 
Why not an Abecedarian program that is universal? First, there is no basis for estimating the 
effects of such a program. Second, as will be seen below, the costs of a full-scale Abecedarian program 
for 15 percent of the population are already extremely high. A universal Abecedarian program would be 
prohibitively expensive. 
The simulations of the distributional effects of the Abecedarian program used similar methods to 
those used for universal preschool. Therefore, the results can be compared (Table 8.7). 
As previously shown in Chapter 4, a full-scale Abecedarian program results in quite large overall 
net benefits. Overall net benefits are over twice those of universal preschool (row 4 vs. row 6). 
Furthermore, a full-scale Abecedarian program results in extraordinary net benefits for the lowest 
income quintile. The program boosts net income for this group by over 30 percent. This is well over four 
times the effects on the lowest income quintile of universal preschool (row 4 vs. row 6).  
Why are the effects of the Abecedarian program for the target group so high compared to 
preschool? The greater effects for Abecedarian compared to preschool probably occur because of the 
more intense services provided by the program to both children and their parents. Five years of full-time, 
high-quality child care and preschool is a more extensive intervention in the lives of children than one 
year of part-time, school-year preschool. Five years of full-time full-year free child care changes the 
working opportunities for parents by more than one-year of part-time, school-year, free child care.  
However, the Abecedarian program is so large and so redistributive that it imposes large net costs 
on the upper 80 percent of the income distribution. The upper 80 percent of the population gets very little 
direct economic development benefits from the Abecedarian program. (There are some economic 
development benefits from the increased spending for these upper income groups, but these benefits are 
small.)  The upper 80 percent of the household income distribution suffers average net losses in income 
due to a full-scale Abecedarian program of about one-half of 1 percent of income (row 4). This far 
 28
exceeds the net losses for any income quintile from universal preschool. And of course universal 
preschool results in net gains for the middle income quintile and below.  
The Abecedarian program is so expensive per participant that its tax burden for the population is 
over twice as great as universal preschool, even though universal preschool is projected to have over four 
times as many participants. (See Table 4.2, and compare the overall tax cost in Tables 8.2 and 8.7.) 
Because of its more limited number of participants, the Abecedarian program has many fewer direct 
beneficiaries, and these beneficiaries are concentrated in the lowest income quintile.  
This analysis, as is true of all the analysis in this book, only looks at economic development 
benefits. Studies have not found evidence that the Abecedarian program reduces crime, so anticrime 
benefits for the overall population cannot be counted on. There may be some benefits for other income 
quintiles in reduced social service costs. 
However, overall, a full-scale Abecedarian program appears to be economically promising but 
politically troubled. The program could deliver large antipoverty benefits. However, achieving such 
benefits puts great demands on the altruism of the majority of the population, which is ineligible for the 
program.  
THE NURSE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARENT CHILD HOME PROGRAM: 
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF SMALLER SCALE ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMS 
The Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) and Parent Child Home Program (PCHP) are quite different 
programs. However, they have some similarities in their patterns of distributional effects.  As detailed in 
Chapter 4, the NFP provides disadvantaged first-time mothers with nurse home visits from the prenatal 
period to age two. These visits focus on delivering a curriculum that includes healthier prenatal care, more 
sensitive child care, and a better maternal life course. Direct hours of interaction during the visits with 
each mother total perhaps 45 hours over this two and a half year period. Estimates suggest that a full-scale 
NFP would perhaps include about 9 percent of all children.  
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The PCHP provides disadvantaged mothers and children, with the child ages two and three, with 
paraprofessional home visits.  The paraprofessional brings a book or educational toy at each visit. Each 
visit is tied to modeling with the mother how to interact with the child using the book or toy.  Direct hours 
of interaction with each mother-child pair during these visits total about 46 hours over this two-year 
period.  Estimates suggest that a full-scale PCHP would include about 5.5 percent of all children.  
The nature of the services provided in these programs are obviously quite different. And they are 
delivered by quite different personnel: nurses for NFP, and paraprofessionals for PCHP. 
However, their pattern of distributional effects has some similarities. Both programs are much 
less intense and costly in services per child than the Abecedarian program. Nurse Family Partnership has 
a present value of $10,000 per child, and PCHP has a present value of $4,600 per child. This compares to 
over $60,000 for the Abecedarian program. Both programs are also highly targeted on the disadvantaged 
population compared to universal preschool. Each serves less than 10 percent of all children, whereas 
universal preschool is estimated to serve about 70 percent of all children.  As shown in Chapter 4, both 
programs have an economic development to cost ratio that exceed one: 1.85 for NFP, and 5.66 for PCHP. 
But the highly targeted nature of these programs, and their relatively modest costs per child, shapes the 
magnitude and distribution of these programs’ economic development benefits.  
I simulated the distributional impact of full-scale versions of the NFP and PCHP (Table 8.8). The 
methodology was identical to that used for universal preschool and the Abecedarian program, to allow 
comparisons. 
These full-scale NFP and PCHP programs are assumed to deliver all of their benefits for children 
and mothers to the lowest income quintile. This is because the full-scale programs that are modeled are 
targeted programs. There is no basis to project what impact these programs would have if delivered 
universally. Both programs were designed to address needs of disadvantaged families. Early experiments 
with the NFP suggested that benefits were greater for more disadvantaged women (Karoly et al. 1998; 
Olds et al. 1997).22 
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As expected based on Chapter 4, these programs have net benefits overall. And given how these 
programs are targeted, these benefits are delivered highly progressively (rows 4 and 8).  
However, the lesser intensity of these programs has two consequences. First, each of these 
programs only has moderate percentage effects on the income of the lowest income quintile, even though 
this quintile receives most of the benefits of these two programs. Each program is estimated to increase 
the incomes of the lowest income quintile by around two percent (rows 4 and 8).  This is about one-third 
of the effects on the lowest income quintile of universal preschool (row 10 vs. rows 4 and 8). These lesser 
effects occur even though NFP and PCHP are far more targeted programs than universal preschool. But 
the services provided by these programs per participant are far less extensive than universal preschool. It 
is not surprising that the benefits are smaller for lower income groups.  
Second, the cost of these programs for the remaining upper 80 percent of the income distribution 
is quite modest. These programs each cost less than one-twentieth of 1 percent of income for these upper 
income groups (rows 4 and 8). In contrast, the costs of the Abecedarian program for upper income 
quintiles are over 10 times as great (row 12).  Compared to the Abecedarian program, NFP and PCHP are 
quite cheap because of the lesser costs per participant. Compared to universal preschool, NFP and PCHP 
are inexpensive because they are far more targeted.  
These findings suggest that politically, a full-scale NFP or PCHP program may be easier sells 
than a full-scale Abecedarian program. The net sacrifice required does not put as much strain on voters’ 
altruism. On the other hand, the antipoverty effects of these interventions are more modest.  
CONCLUSION 
Previous chapters show that high-quality business incentives and early childhood programs can 
deliver economic development benefits that exceed costs for state residents overall. This chapter shows 
that all of these programs increase the progressivity of the income distribution and help the poor.  
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All of the early childhood programs are far more progressive than business incentives in their 
effects on the income distribution. This is partly because some of these early childhood programs are 
designed to target assistance to disadvantaged families. But it also reflects the idea that programs to 
develop human capital may by their very nature deliver more progressive benefits than programs that 
boost labor demand. The progressivity of boosts to labor demand is more limited by the current capacities 
of disadvantaged groups. Early childhood programs are not so limited. As a result, business incentives are 
unlikely to deliver large boosts to the economic well-being of state residents who are poor.  
How politically feasible is it for early childhood programs to be targeted on the poor? For 
smaller-scale programs, such as NFP and PCHP, the program cost is low enough that such targeted efforts 
are probably politically feasible. However, the trade-off is that the antipoverty benefits are modest. These 
programs have the potential to play an important role in addressing the problems of lower income groups. 
However, they clearly do not have sufficiently large effects to be the “solution” to poverty. This should 
not be interpreted as a criticism of these programs. I doubt whether the program authors think that these 
programs can “solve” poverty on their own.    
For large-scale early childhood programs, such as the Abecedarian program and universal 
preschool, their political feasibility may be improved if the program can be plausibly designed to deliver 
broad benefits across many income groups. These larger-scale programs have a greater potential to 
deliver large benefits to lower income groups. Whether this potential is politically enacted and sustained 
depends on whether some combination of altruism and self-interest of the general population can be 
mobilized to support these efforts.  Universal accessibility, if not necessarily universal free access, may be 
helpful in making credible the notion of broad benefits including improvements in property values. But if 
political perceptions change so that broad benefits are not plausible, either because of changing research 
findings or changing perceptions of these findings, then a more targeted program may be the only 
politically sustainable fall-back position. However, targeted programs may be more limited than universal 
programs in the costs that a majority of the public is willing to pay. This more limited willingness to pay 
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may limit the quality and hence effectiveness of a targeted program. It may also limit how many 
disadvantaged children are able to access a targeted program. Universal early childhood programs may be 
more politically effective than targeted programs in delivering assistance to the poor. 
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NOTES 
 
1. For a useful and insightful recent discussion of the consequences of income inequality, and 
recent trends in income inequality in the United States and other industrial democracies, see Kenworthy 
(2008). 
2. The estimated annual cost of universal preschool if implemented nationwide is $17.9 billion. 
As stated in Chapter 2, annual costs of state and local business incentives are probably $20–$30 billion.  
Most of these business incentive dollars come in the form of financial incentives. 
3. Figures on what percentage of each household is in each quintile are reported online by the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, from the 2008 Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey. This reports data for calendar year 2007. The relevant figures are in Table 2 and Table 
A-3 of DeNava-Walt, Proctor, and Smith (2008). The cutoffs for each income quintile are as follows: 
quintile 1 (lowest income), less than $20,300; quintile 2, from $20,300 to less than $39,100; quintile 3 
(middle income), from $39,100 to less than $62,000; quintile 4, from $62,000 to less than $100,000; 
quintile 5 (highest income), $100,000 or more. These income cutoffs are provided online in Table HINC–
05, available at the Census Bureau Web site at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/hhinc/new05_000.htm. Mean income of each quintile, 
available in Table A-3 of Denava-Walt et al. (2008) is: quintile 1, $11,551; quintile 2, $29,442; quintile 3, 
$49,968; quintile 4, $79,111; quintile 5, $167,971. The implied mean income of all households is 
$67,609, which is increased relative to the middle income quintile mean by the high incomes of the top 
quintiles. 
4. All these calculations use figures for current income, and the present value of such, for the 
relevant group. I used current income rather than permanent income because it is more straightforward to 
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measure, and there are better data on effects of policies and programs relative to current income. 
Permanent income is a concept that is never directly measured but only inferred. Trying to measure 
distributional effects relative to permanent income adds complications about how to measure permanent 
income. Is consumption a valid measure of permanent income? How can we incorporate borrowing 
constraints into a model of effective permanent income? The distributional calculations relative to current 
income probably exaggerate the progressivity of all programs relative to the permanent income 
distribution. However, the relative progressivity of the different programs would probably hold even if 
measured against permanent income. 
5. Specifically, I first used this book’s model to calculate the present value of earnings increases 
due to business incentives, as a percentage of the present value of earnings. This was then multiplied by 
0.735. This factor of 0.735 reflects the estimated labor share of income (Gordon 2009). I use Gordon’s 
figures for the average labor share from 1998–2008. Looking at Commerce Department figures on 
personal income and compensation, and allowing for proprietors’ income to have two-thirds’ labor share, 
yielded similar labor share figures.  The overall percentage effect on income for all households was then 
allocated across income quintiles based on the results in Bartik (1994). I used my estimates from this 
paper of how income percentages varied by quintile to calculate percentage effects in each income 
quintile. These percentage figures were then translated into dollar impact figures using each quintile’s 
estimated share of total income. 
6. These estimates use fairly standard incidence assumptions. However, as noted by Reschovsky 
(1998), they may yield more regressive impacts of state and local taxes than is consistent with many 
economists’ views of tax incidence. Therefore, these estimates are somewhat tilted toward not finding 
progressive effects of these various economic development programs. As a result, the finding in this 
chapter of progressive impacts of all these programs is strengthened. I also considered incidence using 
Pechman’s estimates (Pechman 1985, variant 3b, p. 61). I had used Pechman’s estimates in Bartik (1994). 
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Pechman’s estimates are somewhat more regressive at the lower end, and more progressive between the 
middle and high end. The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) numbers imply the 
following relative tax rates by quintile, where the overall tax rate average is indexed as 1.00: quintile 1 
(lowest), 1.26; quintile 2, 1.15; quintile 3, 1.10; quintile 4, 1.04; quintile 5 (highest), 0.91. Pechman’s 
numbers imply the following relative tax rates by quintile: quintile 1, 1.48; quintile 2, 1.11; quintile 3, 
0.97; quintile 4, 0.91; quintile 5, 1.00. None of the qualitative and quantitative findings of this chapter are 
altered significantly by using the Pechman incidence assumptions rather than the ITEP incidence 
assumptions. The interested reader can use the numbers in this endnote to recalculate the numbers. 
The allocation first calculates the present value of taxes paid overall for business incentives, 
divided by the present value of future earnings. This percentage is then multiplied by 0.735 to reflect the 
share of labor compensation in total income. The overall percentage share of taxes in income is then used 
to calculate the percentage share of taxes in income of each quintile using the relative percentage tax rates 
in McIntyre et al. (2003). The specific ITEP numbers I used were state and local taxes before considering 
the potential federal income tax offset. This is the row labeled “Total taxes” in the table for “Averages for 
All States.” Therefore, there may be some additional net benefits from all these programs, both business 
incentives and early childhood programs, from federal tax deductibility, particularly for higher income 
quintiles.  
The ITEP figures for tax burden by income quintile are for nonelderly couples and individuals. 
Therefore, the procedure I use is implicitly assuming that tax burdens by household income quintile 
follow the pattern for tax burdens by income quintile for nonelderly couples and individuals.  
7. These calculations focus on the economic development benefits. They do not include the 
effects on capital gains that were included in my 1994 paper. But including in capital gains does not make 
much difference. The real earnings effects calculated here already adjust for changes in local prices, 
including changes in local housing prices. Therefore, capital gains due to increases in property values are 
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a net addition to benefits, above and beyond what has been counted so far. These capital gains have an 
estimated present value of only about one-twentieth of 1 percent of the present value of income. The 
ratios of gross earnings benefits plus capital gains to tax costs, by income quintile, are: quintile 1 (lowest), 
6.30; quintile 2, 3.83; quintile 3, 3.83; quintile 4, 4.13; quintile 5, 2.08; overall, 3.35.  These ratios are not 
much of an increase from what is reported in Table 8.1. 
8.  This research design is referred to as a regression discontinuity design. It is reasonably 
rigorous evidence of true causal effects. Although there are other studies of how preschool effects differ 
with economic status, all these other studies are potentially subject to much more serious selection effects. 
Parents choose to send their children to preschool. As a result of this choice, preschool attendees differ 
from nonpreschool attendees in many ways, both observed and (most critically) unobserved. This 
selection will bias estimates of preschool effects. There is no reason to think that this selection bias will 
be of similar magnitude or even sign across different income groups.  
9.  Gormley and his colleagues do not report the statistical significance of these differentials 
across different income groups. My own calculations suggest that in comparisons across any two groups 
for any of the tests, the results are not statistically significantly different across income groups. This can 
be computed by calculating the difference of estimates, and then calculating the variance assuming the 
coefficient estimates are uncorrelated. They would appear to be uncorrelated in that each estimate comes 
from separate regression estimates using a different sample. With the three tests involved and three 
groups, there are nine possible comparisons of two groups for a given test. Six of these nine comparisons 
have t-statistics on the differences of less than one in absolute value. The largest in absolute value t-
statistic is 1.47, which is statistically significant only at the 14 percent level. 
10.  Appendix 8A summarizes their distributional assumptions, and explains how I use them to 
generate some distributional results by quintile. 
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11.  Earnings effects per quintile do not fall off quite so fast per household in each quintile. The 
Karoly and Bigelow enrollment assumptions imply that although a higher percentage of four-year-olds 
who are low income enroll in universal preschool, this enrollment is a lower percentage of households in 
the lowest income quintile. This probably reflects that the lowest income quintile includes a considerable 
number of single person households.  The pattern of dollar benefits per household, relative to the lowest 
income quintile, follow this pattern: quintile 1, 1.00; quintile 2, 0.87; quintile 3, 0.43; quintile 4, 0.12; 
quintile 5, 0.12. See appendix 8A for more details. 
12.  Because of the way in which these distributional effects are calculated, the model implicitly 
assumes that such phenomena as peer effects and displacement effects occur within each quintile. If peer 
effects or displacement effects occur across quintiles, this will broaden the benefits of preschool 
somewhat. However, there is no way to reliably estimate the extent of such broadening. It seems unlikely 
that such broadening would significantly reduce the highly progressive nature of benefits for preschool 
and other early childhood programs.  
13.  This 7 percent figure does not measure the annual percentage effect of preschool on 
participants. The 7 percent is the present value of the effect on state residents as a percent of the present 
value of the income of that quintile. This will be below the long-run annual effects on former child 
participants for several reasons. First, some former child participants move out of state. Second, the 
model allows for displacement effects. Third, because the effect on former child participants is long-
delayed, this reduces the present value percentage effect relative to the long-run annual percentage effect. 
Calculations of annual percentage effects on participants suggest that they average 17.3 percent from ages 
16 to 79. This is an unweighted average. The percentage effects do not vary greatly across years. 
Percentage effects on earnings for each year range from 13.6 percent to 23.5 percent. 
14.  Estimated effects for the lowest income quintile are somewhat reduced relative to CPC 
because the CPC estimates are only assumed to fully apply to lower income children who otherwise 
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would have attended no preschool. Some members of the lowest income quintile would otherwise have 
attended some other preschool program. The estimated benefits for these children are assumed to be lower 
than the CPC program’s estimated effects. Overall, the average benefits per participant for the lowest 
income quintile are about 61 percent of the estimated benefits per participant of the CPC program. 
15.  Preschool’s benefits lead to a 0.618 percent boost to the present value of overall earnings, as 
a percentage of the present value of income (Table 8.2, row 2). The property value increase is equivalent 
to 0.259 percent of the present value of income (row 3). Therefore, capitalization into higher property 
values captures about 47 percent of the earnings effects of preschool (47 percent = 0.259 divided by 
0.618).  Overall property value increases do not capture all the overall earnings effects of preschool 
because we assume different discount rates. From a social perspective, we use 3 percent to discount future 
earnings. But we assume that property buyers and sellers use a higher discount rate in determining 
property bids. Individuals may be more myopic in their market behavior than is socially optimal. 
16.  Why doesn’t capitalization differentiate by income groups to capture differential benefits? 
Differential capitalization is implausible given that land can be reallocated from one housing type to 
another. In terms of Table 8.3, if capitalization differentiates by income group, then capitalization implies 
that housing prices of the lowest income quintile would have to go up by much more in percentage terms 
than those of the average household, while housing prices of the highest income quintile would go up by 
much less in percentage terms than for the average household. Presumably these housing price changes 
are due to differential land price changes, as in the long run the price of structure capital should be related 
to replacement costs. In any event, it would be very difficult to sustain the large implied differences in 
land prices between income groups implied by nonuniform capitalization. Perhaps in theory some 
perfectly enforced zoning and new housing regulations could do so. In practice, the required land price 
differentials seem likely to overwhelm any such regulatory barriers. 
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17.  This largely occurs because the lower-income household groups seem to have fewer four-
year-olds. This probably occurs because lower-income households have a greater percentage of single 
individual households. 
18.  This fee is based on the preschool being three hours a day, 180 days a year, and costing in 
2007 dollars $4,747. This cost is what was assumed in my original report in 2006. These cost estimates 
were derived by Karoly and Bigelow (2005). This is roughly consistent with what a high-quality 
preschool is assumed to cost in Gault et al. (2008). There, a similar three-hour per day school year 
program, and a lead teacher paid public school wages, costs $4,071 per year per child at a class size of 20 
to 2, $4,506 per year per child at a class size of 17 to 2, and $4,893 per year per child at a class size of 15 
to 2. The fee calculation also adds in extra administrative costs of 5 percent above this $4,747 per child to 
monitor family income and regularly collect the fees. 
19.  This figure is taken from PPL Table 6B from the online version of Smith (2002) 
(http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/child/ppl-964/tab06.pdf).  
Specifically, I looked at the weekly child care expenditures divided by weekly child care hours 
for children less than five, and for families with annual incomes greater than $69,763 per year in 2007 
dollars. (In the table, these are families with an average monthly income of greater than $4,500 in 1997 
dollars.) I then updated this hourly figure to 2007 dollars using the CPI. 
20.  Karoly and Bigelow (2005) assumed that charging fees will increase administrative costs by 
10 percent. However, this appears to be based on a statement by Barnett (1993) that refers to overall 
administrative costs of welfare programs, not the extra administrative costs to simply charging fees. 
Studies of administrative costs as a percentage of benefits in the U.S. suggest that non-means-tested 
programs such as Social Security have administrative costs of 2.5 percent of benefits, while welfare and 
unemployment insurance programs have administrative costs of 12.1 percent and 11.8 percent of benefits 
(Kesselman [1982], of which I was made aware by Besley and Kanbur [1990]). This might suggest that 
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means testing adds 9–10 percent in administrative costs as a percentage of benefits. However, many of the 
administrative costs of welfare and unemployment insurance programs are due to complex work search 
rules, as well as administrative procedures that in part are meant to discourage usage. Therefore, I suspect 
that the extra administrative costs of charging fees to upper-income families in a universal preschool 
program would be considerably less than 9–10 percent. An extra 5 percent is a somewhat arbitrary but 
reasonable assumption. 
21.  This can be derived by comparing row 2 vs. the fees paid, given by the difference between 
row 7 and row 3. For income quintile 4, the earnings benefits from preschool with fees are 0.105 percent 
of income, whereas fees are 0.090 percent of income. For income quintile 5, the earnings benefits from 
preschool are 0.048 percent of income, whereas fees are 0.042 percent of income. 
22.  It might be interesting to explore further impacts of other home visiting programs if delivered 
universally. For example, the Parents as Teachers program has at 57 percent of its sites been run as a 
universal access program (Parents as Teachers National Center 2008). 
Table 8.1  Distributional Effects of Business Incentives 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
        
 Business incentive effects on:       
2 Relative dollar effects on earnings, disadvantaged group=1 1.00 1.39 2.25 3.64 3.10 2.38 
3 Earnings benefits as % of income 1.726 0.940 0.892 0.914 0.366 0.698 
4 Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
5 Net benefits as % of income 1.445 0.684 0.648 0.682 0.165 0.476 
6 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 6.15 3.67 3.66 3.95 1.82 3.14 
NOTE: Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest income quintile equals one.  All figures for percentages of income report present 
value of that item as percentages of present value of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios of present value of earnings benefits or net income benefit 
to present value of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value calculations use 3% real discount rate. Overall earnings effects and tax costs come from the 
simulation model for business incentives of this book. Earnings are translated into income percentages using labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings 
effects are allocated across quintiles based on how income effects of labor demand increases are allocated across quintiles in Bartik (2004). Tax costs are 
allocated across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More details are in text and endnotes to 
text.  
Table 8.2  Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool, Baseline Distributional Assumptions (with Comparisons to Business Incentives) 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
        
 Preschool effects on:       
2 Relative dollar effects on earnings, disadvantaged group=1 1.00 0.81 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.38 
3 Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.404 0.710 0.138 0.064 0.618 
4 Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
5 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 2.147 0.466 -0.094 -0.138 0.396 
6 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 9.38 2.91 0.59 0.32 2.78 
        
 Comparison with business incentive effects on:       
7 Net benefits as % of income 1.445 0.684 0.648 0.682 0.165 0.476 
8 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 6.15 3.67 3.66 3.95 1.82 3.14 
NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool under the baseline distributional assumptions. Bottom rows show distributional effects of business 
incentives, and are taken from Table 8.1. Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest income quintile equals one.  All figures for 
percentages of income report present value of that item as percentages of present value of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios of present value of 
earnings benefits or net income benefit to present value of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value calculations use 3% real discount rate. Overall 
earnings effects and tax costs come from the simulation model for universal preschool used in this book, and described in Chapter 4. Earnings are translated into 
income percentages using labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings effects for former child participants and parents are allocated across quintiles based on 
the Karoly and Bigelow (2005) distributional assumptions, which are applied to quintiles as explained in Appendix 8A. Balanced budget multiplier spending 
effects on earnings are allocated across quintiles based on how labor demand increases are allocated across quintiles in Bartik (2004). Tax costs are allocated 
across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More details are in text and endnotes to text.  
Table 8.3  Distributional Effects with Capitalization Effects of Universal Preschool 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
        
 Preschool effects with capitalization on:        
2 Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.404 0.710 0.138 0.064 0.618 
3 Costs of increased housing prices to consumers 0.753 0.398 0.295 0.247 0.196 0.259 
4 Benefits of increased housing prices to property owners 0.239 0.232 0.228 0.232 0.289 0.259 
5 Net benefits before taxes and after capitalization (row 2-row3+row4) 6.531 2.237 0.643 0.123 0.157 0.618 
6 Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
7 Net benefits as % of income 6.250 1.981 0.400 -0.109 -0.045 0.396 
8 Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs 23.25 8.73 2.64 0.53 0.78 2.78 
        
 Comparison to preschool effects without capitalization       
9 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 2.147 0.466 -0.094 -0.138 0.396 
10 Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs 25.08 9.38 2.91 0.59 0.32 2.78 
NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool when housing prices increase. Bottom rows show effects without such capitalization effects, and are 
taken from Table 8.2. Earnings effects and tax costs for capitalization case are also taken from Table 8.2. Overall capitalization effects are based on assumption 
of property buyers and sellers having full knowledge of overall earnings effects of universal preschool, and using a 4.7% discount rate to value such effects. This 
leads to 6.1% increase in property values, as explained in Chapter 7 (Table 7.3 and surrounding text). This property value increase is recalculated as a percentage 
of the present value of overall income, using figures on earnings and a labor share of income of 73.5% (Gordon 2009). The effects of this housing price increase 
is allocated across consumers based on each income quintile’s share of total shelter expenditures in the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2007 (see the Web site 
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.bls.gov/cex/2007/Standard/quintile.pdf). The effects of this housing price increase is allocated across property 
owners based on figures used in Bartik (2004) on how home ownership, ownership of rental property, and ownership of business real estate are divided across 
income quintiles. How these calculations are done is detailed in Bartik (1994), but the allocation is largely based on Current Population Survey information on 
each income quintile’s share of rental and dividend income, and self-employment income, and on each income quintile’s home ownership, combined with 
American Housing Survey data on home values by income quintile.  
 
Table 8.4  Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool under Alternative Distributional Assumptions 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row#  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
 Preschool effects under       
        
 Baseline distributional assumptions on:        
2 Relative dollar effect  on earnings, disadvantaged group=1 1.00 0.81 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.38 
3 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 2.147 0.466 -0.094 -0.138 0.396 
4 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 9.38 2.91 0.59 0.32 2.78 
        
 “Equal dollar” distributional assumptions       
5 Relative dollar effect  on earnings, disadvantaged group=1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
6 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 2.713 1.959 1.411 0.571 1.370 
7 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 11.59 9.03 7.09 3.83 7.16 
        
 “Only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions       
8 Relative dollar effect  on earnings, disadvantaged group=1 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 
9 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 1.755 -0.219 -0.217 -0.195 0.203 
10 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 7.85 0.10 0.06 0.03 1.91 
NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal preschool under the baseline distributional assumptions. These figures are taken from Table 8.2. The next two 
sets of results resimulate these effects under alternative distributional assumptions. These alternative distributional assumptions assume the same dollar effects 
per participant for children in the lowest income quintile. What changes is what these dollar effects per participant are for other income quintiles. The “equal 
dollar” assumptions assume that the dollar effect per participant is the same for all quintiles. The “only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumption assume 
that the dollar effects per participant only occur for the disadvantaged group in Karoly and Bigelow (2005), which is in the bottom 35% of the household income 
distribution. Tax costs are not reported in this table, but are the same as in Table 8.2. All percentage effects are for present value of relevant value as percentage 
of present value of income. 
Table 8.5  Distributional Effects of Targeted Preschool Program vs. Universal Preschool Program, under Alternative Distributional Assumptions 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row # 
Targeted or 
universal program? Distributional assumptions  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1   Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
          
2 
3 
Targeted and 
universal 
Consistent with all 3 sets Tax costs of targeted as % of income 
Tax costs of universal as % of income 
0.072 
0.281 
0.066 
0.256 
0.063 
0.244 
0.060 
0.232 
0.052 
0.202 
0.057 
0.222 
          
4 
5 
Targeted Consistent with all 3 sets Preschool net benefits as % of income 
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 
6.873 
96.15 
1.905 
29.91 
-0.060 
0.05 
-0.056 
0.05 
-0.051 
0.03 
0.352 
7.16 
          
6 
7 
Universal Baseline  Preschool net benefits as % of income 
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 
6.765 
25.08 
2.147 
9.38 
0.466 
2.91 
-0.094 
0.59 
-0.138 
0.32 
0.396 
2.78 
          
8 
9 
Universal with 
capitalization 
Baseline  Preschool net benefits as % of income 
Preschool’s ratio of earnings and housing price 
effects to tax costs 
6.250 
23.25 
1.981 
8.73 
0.400 
2.64 
-0.109 
0.53 
-0.045 
0.78 
0.396 
2.78 
          
10 
11 
Universal “Equal dollar”  Preschool net benefits as % of income 
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 
6.765 
25.08 
2.713 
11.59 
1.959 
9.03 
1.411 
7.09 
0.571 
3.83 
1.370 
7.16 
          
12 
13 
Universal “Only disadvantaged benefit” Preschool net benefits as % of income 
Preschool’s ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 
6.765 
25.08 
1.755 
7.85 
-0.219 
0.10 
-0.217 
0.06 
-0.195 
0.03 
0.203 
1.91 
NOTE: The top rows consider tax costs of a targeted vs. a universal program. The next rows consider the effects of a targeted program on net income and the ratio 
of earnings effects to tax costs. For comparison, the following rows compare these effects to effects of universal preschool program under various distributional 
assumptions. The baseline distributional assumption results for universal preschool are taken from Table 8.2. The results with capitalization are taken from Table 
8.3. The results for the “equal dollar” and “only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions are taken from Table 8.4. The targeted program only includes 
preschool for the disadvantaged group, which is in the bottom 35% of the household income distribution and makes up 26% of the enrollment in a universal 
program. Therefore, the tax costs in the top row are simply 26% of the universal program’s costs. The net benefits and benefit to cost ratios for the targeted 
program are simulated by assuming the same effects for disadvantaged children and parents as under the universal program, but setting such effects for all other 
groups to zero because they will not be enrolled. The balanced budget multiplier effects of spending are also reduced to 26% of the original spending effects for 
all groups. As in all the tables in this chapter, effects as % of income are present value of relevant variable effects as percentage of present value of income. 
Ratios are ratios of present values of relevant variables. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate. 
Table 8.6  Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row # Fees or free?  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1  Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
         
  Effects of universal preschool with fees on:       
2 Fees Earnings benefits as % of income 7.030 2.398 0.708 0.105 0.048 0.601 
3  Tax costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.169 0.147 0.162 
4  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.825 2.211 0.530 -0.065 -0.099 0.439 
5  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 34.25 12.81 3.97 0.62 0.33 3.70 
6  Tax plus fee costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.259 0.190 0.205 
7  Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income 6.825 2.211 0.530 -0.155 -0.141 0.397 
8  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs 34.25 12.81 3.97 0.40 0.26 2.94 
         
  Effects of universal preschool that is free on:       
9 Free (baseline) Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.404 0.710 0.138 0.064 0.618 
10  Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
11  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.765 2.147 0.466 -0.094 -0.138 0.396 
12  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 9.38 2.91 0.59 0.32 2.78 
NOTE: The first set of rows examines the effects of an universal preschool program with income-based fees. These rows analyze net benefits, and ratio of benefits 
to costs, in two ways. One way simply looks at benefits vs. tax costs. The other way includes fees as part of costs. The inclusion of fees is proper from an overall 
social benefits analysis. However, the analysis without fees is more relevant for households who do not use universal preschool.  The second set of rows 
considers the case of universal preschool without any fees. These estimates are taken from Table 8.2. The fees are set and analyzed as described in the text. The 
reduced usage induced by fees requires that both tax costs and balanced budget multiplier effects be recalculated for all groups. In addition, the earnings benefits 
of preschool must be recalculated for all groups. I assume usage of preschool due to fees is distributed equally across the top two income quintiles. The effects as 
percentage of income are present value of relevant variable as percentage of present value of income. The ratios are ratio of present value of benefits to present 
value of costs.  Present value calculations use 3% discount rate. 
Table 8.7  Distributional Effects of Abecedarian Program 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
        
 Abecedarian program’s effects on:        
2 Earnings as % of income 31.762 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.011 1.100 
3 Tax costs as % of income 0.617 0.563 0.536 0.509 0.443 0.489 
4 Net benefits as % of income 31.145 -0.534 -0.509 -0.481 -0.432 0.611 
5 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 51.45 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 2.25 
        
 Comparison to universal preschool’s effects on:       
6 Net benefits as % of income 6.765 2.147 0.466 -0.094 -0.138 0.396 
7 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 9.38 2.91 0.59 0.32 2.78 
NOTE: The top rows show distributional effects for a full-scale Abecedarian program. The bottom rows show distributional effects for a universal preschool 
program. These bottom rows are taken from Table 8.2. The overall size, effects, and costs of an Abecedarian program are derived in Chapter 4. The earnings 
effects due to effects on former child participants and their parents are derived by assuming all of these effects are allocated to the lowest income quintile; see 
text for rationale for this assumption. Balanced budget multiplier effects of spending are allocated across quintiles based on results in Bartik (1994) of 
distributional effects of labor demand. Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based on results in McIntyre et al. (2003). These procedures are similar to what 
was done for universal preschool in Table 8.2. All effects as percentage of income are effects on present value of relevant variable as percentage of present value 
of income. All ratio effects are ratios of effects on present value of benefits to present value of costs. Present value calculations use 3% discount rate. 
Table 8.8  Distributional Effects for Nurse Family Partnership (NFP) and Parent Child Home Program (PCHP) 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1 Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
        
 NFP’s effects on:       
2 
3 
4 
5 
Earnings as % of income 
Tax costs as % of income 
Net benefits as % of income 
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs 
2.456 
0.058 
2.398 
42.14 
0.003 
0.053 
-0.050 
0.05 
0.003 
0.051 
-0.048 
0.05 
0.003 
0.048 
-0.045 
0.05 
0.001 
0.042 
-0.041 
0.03 
0.085 
0.046 
0.039 
1.85 
        
 PCHPS’s effects on:       
6 
7 
8 
9 
Earnings as % of income 
Tax costs as % of income 
Net benefits as % of income 
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs 
2.115 
0.016 
2.098 
130.85 
0.001 
0.015 
-0.014 
0.05 
0.001 
0.014 
-0.013 
0.05 
0.001 
0.013 
-0.013 
0.06 
0.000 
0.012 
-0.011 
0.03 
0.072 
0.013 
0.060 
5.66 
        
 Comparison: Universal preschool’s effects on:        
10 
11 
Net benefits as % of income 
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs 
6.666 
24.73 
2.288 
9.93 
0.447 
2.83 
-0.107 
0.54 
-0.144 
0.29 
0.396 
2.78 
        
 Comparison: Abecedarian effects on:       
12 
13 
Net benefits as % of income 
Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs 
31.145 
51.45 
-0.534 
0.05 
-0.509 
0.05 
-0.481 
0.06 
-0.432 
0.03 
0.611 
2.25 
NOTE: The top rows show effects for full-scale implementation of the Nurse Family Partnership (NFP). The next set of rows show effects for full-scale 
implementation of the Parent Child Home Program (PCHP). The next set of rows show effects for universal preschool. The final set of rows show effects from 
the Abecedarian program. The universal preschool effects and Abecedarian effects come from Table 8.2 and Table 8.7, respectively. The NFP and PCHP effects 
on overall earnings and taxes are derived from the simulation models outlined in Chapter 4. These effects are expressed as percentages of income by using data 
from Gordon (2009) on the labor share. NFP and PCHP effects on former child participants and parents are allocated across quintile under the assumption that all 
such effects occur in the lowest income quintile. Balanced budget multiplier effects of NFP and PCHP are allocated across quintiles based on estimates in Bartik 
(2004) of how labor demand affects income of different quintiles. Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based on estimates by McIntyre et al. (2003). All 
effects for percentage of income are the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage of the present value of income.  All ratios of earnings to tax costs 
are the present value of earnings effects to the present value of tax costs. All present value calculations use a 3% social discount rate.  
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APPENDIX 8A 
DISTRIBUTING PRESCHOOL BENEFITS BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUINTILE 
The baseline distributional effects of universal preschool are based on a model used by Karoly 
and Bigelow (2005). The same model is crucial to estimating the overall effects of universal preschool, as 
outlined in Chapter 4. This is because all the estimates of overall effects of universal preschool are based 
on how effects for middle- and upper-class groups compare to effects on lower-class groups. The lower-
class group effects are derived from studies of the Chicago Child Parent Center (CPC) program and the 
Perry Preschool program. Both the distributional and overall effects then depend upon the extent to which 
these middle- and upper-class group effects are below those of the CPC and Perry programs.  
Table 8A.1 summarizes the distributional assumptions made by Karoly and Bigelow. (A version 
of this table was previously included as Table 7 in my 2006 paper.) These numbers dictate exactly how 
much overall benefit there is in each income classification, and what overall benefit there is from 
universal preschool, compared to the expected benefit for a low-income child from participating in 
universal preschool vs. no preschool at all. It is assumed that the CPC and Perry estimates reveal the 
benefits of high-quality preschool for a low-income child versus having no preschool experience at all. 
I combine these assumptions with estimates of the household income distribution to generate 
numbers for how preschool impact and enrollment is divided among these three groups, and how this 
compares with how households are divided among these groups (Table 8A.2). Preschool’s total impact is 
defined as the product of the benefit percentage in the above table for each cell times the percentage of all 
four-year-olds in that cell. This calculation results in an index of the size of the impact in each income 
category, which can then be reindexed to a 100 percent total for all three groups.  To calculate how 
households are divided among the three groups, I use published data on the household income distribution 
from the Current Population Survey to calculate what percent of all households are in these three groups.1 
 8A-2
These figures are then used to generate an index for relative benefits or impact per participant, 
relative participation or enrollment in preschool per household, and relative benefits or impact or benefits 
per household (Table 8A.3). These figures are derived by dividing how the numerator variable is 
allocated across the three groups by how the denominator is divided among the three groups, and then 
reindexing so that the index for the lowest income group equals 1.00. 
I then translate these figures into similar relative indices for the different income quintiles. I 
generate these numbers by acting as if the relative benefit and participation per household figures are 
uniform within each of the three income groups. These three income groups are then parceled out among 
the five income quintiles. The figure for the income quintile will then be a weighted average of the 
income groups making up that quintile, with the weights equal to the proportion of each income group in 
that quintile. As the lowest income quintile and the top two income quintiles are each made up of only 
one of the three income groups, no weighted average calculation is needed for those three income 
quintiles. However, income quintiles 2 and 3 are each a weighted average of two of the three income 
groups. The figures for relative benefits per participant are then calculated by dividing relative benefits 
per household by relative enrollment per household.  
This calculation procedure is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It is based upon Karoly and 
Bigelow’s assumptions, which are plausible and reasonable guesses to how enrollment and benefits will 
vary across income groups.  
However, the bottom line is that the benefits per participant and benefits per household indices 
follow a plausible pattern across income quintiles. The benefits decline greatly going from the lowest 
income quintile to the middle income quintile, but not to zero. The benefits undergo an even more drastic 
decline for the top two income quintiles, so that benefits for upper income quintiles are but a small 
percentage of those for the lowest income quintile. This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the 
positions of various preschool experts such as Steven Barnett and James Heckman as to how preschool 
benefits vary with income. Furthermore, the pattern of how enrollment per household varies with income 
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is also reasonable.  We would think that the lower income quintiles would have more single individual 
households who would not have any four-year-olds.  
In addition to providing reasonable patterns of how benefits vary by income quintile, these 
procedures also ensure that the distributional effect calculations in Chapter 8 are consistent with the 
overall effect calculations in Chapter 4. Both are based on the same assumptions about how preschool 
effectiveness tails off in a universal preschool program, compared to a targeted preschool program, as we 
include middle- and upper-class children in the program.  
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NOTES 
 
1.  These calculations require a little interpolation, as the published data only report the income distribution in 
$2,500 per year intervals. 
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Table 8A.1  Assumptions about How Enrollment in Universal Preschool is Divided among Different 
Groups 
How group affected by universal 
preschool program (% of four-
year-olds) 
High risk: 
< $33,805 
in family income 
Medium risk: 
$33,805–$56,342 
in family income 
Low risk: 
> $56,342 
in family income 
Total four-year-
olds in risk group 
In public now, none otherwise 5(100)a 3(50) 7(25) 15 
In public now, lower-cost public 
otherwise 
12(50) 8(25) 13(0) 33 
In public now, private otherwise 1(0) 3(0 ) 18(0) 22 
Total in public program now 18 14 38 70 
Private now 1 2 7 10 
Total in preschool now 19 16 45 80 
None now 6 4 10 20 
Total four-year-olds in risk group 25 20 55 100 
aThe number in parentheses in the nine cells in the upper quadrant is the percentage of benefits the group in that cell 
gets, compared to the benefits assumed for high-risk group members who otherwise would not be in any preschool. 
 
NOTE: These numbers are taken from Table 7, Bartik (2006). They are based upon Karoly and Bigelow (2005). The 
income categories are updated to 2007 prices.  The first number in each cell is the percentage of all four-year-olds in 
that cell. The columns divide all four-year-olds by their family income. The rows divide all four-year-olds by 
whether they are enrolled in the universal preschool program, and by what type of preschool, if any, they would 
have been enrolled in if the universal preschool program did not exist. For example, for the high-risk group, the 
bottom row shows that this group constitutes 25% of all four-year-olds. The top row for the high-risk group shows 
that 5% of all four-year-olds are high-risk group members who enroll in the universal preschool program, but would 
otherwise have not been enrolled in preschool; we can calculate from these numbers that this 5% of all four-year-
olds is 20% (= 5% / 25%) of all high-risk four-year-olds. 
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Table 8A.2  Allocation of Preschool Impact, Preschool Enrollment, and Households among Three 
Different Income Categories, and Implications of This Allocation for Relative Impact per 
Participant, Relative Impact per Household, and Relative Enrollment per Household 
Income group 
 < $33,805 $33,805 to $56,342 > $56,342 
Total, All Income 
Groups 
Impact (%) 67.7 21.5 10.8 100.0 
Enrollment (%) 25.7 20.0 54.3 100.0 
Four-year-old population (%) 25.0 20.0 55.0 100.0 
Households (%) 34.5 20.7 44.8 100.0 
     
Relative impact per participant 1.00 0.41 0.08 0.38 
Relative enrollment per household 1.00 1.30 1.63 1.34 
Relative impact per household 1.00 0.53 0.12 0.51 
NOTE: The first three rows, dividing impact, enrollment, and the four-year-old population among these three income 
groups, is derived from Table 8A.1, and in turn is based on Karoly and Bigelow. The impact index is the product of 
the sum of the benefit percentages times the four-year-old percentages for each income category, and is reindexed to 
total 100%. The household percentages are derived from Current Population Survey information online from the 
Annual Social And Economic Supplement for 2008, which reports data for households in 2007. The particular table 
used is Table HINC-06. The remaining rows are based on dividing the allocation factors by each other and then 
reindexing so that the lowest income group is equal to 1.00. For example, the impact per participant is based on 
dividing the allocation percentage for impact by the allocation factor for enrollment, and then dividing this 
calculation for each cell by the same calculation for the low income group. I do not calculate the enrollment per 
four-year-old, but merely note that while it is close to the same for each income group, there is a very slight 
tendency for enrollment per four-year-old to decline with increased income.  
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Table 8A.3  Relative Benefits per Participant, Relative Enrollment per Household, and Relative Benefits 
per Household, for Five Household Income Quintiles, and Overall, with Lowest Income 
Quintile Indexed to 1.00 
Income quintile 
Lowest Middle Highest 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
All 
households 
Relative benefits per participant 1.00 0.81 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.38 
Relative enrollment per household 1.00 1.08 1.38 1.63 1.63 1.34 
Relative benefits per household 1.00 0.87 0.43 0.12 0.12 0.51 
NOTE: These figures for each income quintile are derived from Table 8A.2. Numbers for enrollment per household 
and benefits per household re allocated to each income quintile by assuming that these same figures for enrollment 
per household and benefits per household are uniform within each of the three income groups defined in Table 8A.2. 
These three income groups are then divided up among the five income quintiles, and the figures for each income 
quintile are a weighted average of the income groups that make up that income quintile. For the lowest income 
quintile, and the top two income quintiles, these three income quintiles are only made up of one income group each. 
The second income quintile is made up of a combination of the lowest and middle income group, with (34.5 − 
20)/20 from the lowest income group, and (40 − 34.5)/20 from the middle income group. The third income quintile 
is made up of a combination of the middle income group and upper income group. (34.5 + 20.7 − 40)/20 comes from 
the middle income group, and (60 − 43.5 − 20.7)/20 comes from the upper income group. Benefits per participant 
are then calculated by dividing benefits per household by enrollment per household. 
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APPENDIX 8B 
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INCOME-BASED FEES UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HOW PRESCHOOL BENEFITS VARY WITH INCOME 
The chapter text considers the impact of income-based fees under the baseline assumptions about 
how preschool benefits vary with income. These baseline assumptions have dollar benefits of preschool 
declining with household income. However, middle-class households still get some significant benefits. 
Upper-class households get very small benefits, but they are positive.  
This appendix considers the impact of income-based fees under two alternative assumptions 
about how preschool benefits vary with income. These alternative assumptions are the same as those 
considered in the chapter section on the implications of targeting preschool access only on the 
disadvantaged. One alternative is that preschool benefits are equal in dollar terms for all income groups. 
A second alternative is that only the disadvantaged benefit from preschool. By “disadvantaged,” I mean 
the families in the bottom 35 percent of the household income distribution that Karoly and Bigelow 
classify as “high-risk.” 
I first do simulations using the same responsiveness of preschool demand to fees that was 
assumed in the chapter text (Table 8B.1). This demand responsiveness led to a 25 percent reduction in 
preschool usage by the households who are charged fees, those in the top 40 percent of the income 
distribution. 
As one would expect, income-based fees reduce overall net benefits if preschool has equal dollar 
benefits for all income groups (from 1.370 percent of income overall to 1.192 percent overall, row 11 vs. 
row 7). Under this distributional assumption, it is inefficient to reduce preschool usage by the richest 40 
percent of households. However, the cutback in overall benefits is not as severe as strictly targeting 
preschool on the disadvantaged. As shown in the chapter, strictly targeting preschool on the 
disadvantaged reduced overall benefits to 0.397 percent of income (Table 8.6, row 7). The fee structure 
preserves middle class benefits and more modestly reduces upper-class benefits. 
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As one would also expect, income-based fees increase overall net benefits if preschool only 
benefits the disadvantaged (from 0.203 percent of income to 0.218 percent of income, for 22 vs. row 18). 
Under this distributional assumption, cutting back modestly on upper-class usage of preschool reduces 
overall costs more than benefits. The gain in overall preschool benefits is not as great as from strictly 
targeting preschool on the disadvantaged. Strictly targeting preschool on the disadvantaged increases 
overall benefits to 0.397 percent of income. Under these distributional assumptions, a strict targeting 
policy is perfectly matched to the assumed distributional effects.  
I also considered alternative possible responses of demand to fees (Table 8B.2). It could be 
argued that the distribution of benefits might affect the responsiveness of upper-class demand to fees. If 
upper-class children benefit greatly from preschool, demand should not respond much to modest fees. If 
upper-class children have no benefits from preschool, demand should respond by a large amount to even 
modest fees. 
The defect in this argument is that it assumes that upper-class families have better knowledge 
about preschool’s impact on their children’s future than preschool researchers. If we don’t know for 
certain the magnitude of preschool’s benefits for upper-class children, how do families know? What 
experiences and data might they have that would give them this superior knowledge? Families might have 
superior knowledge of whether their child likes preschool, or how valuable such child care is to the 
family’s earnings capacity. But in this case the issue is the impact on the child’s future, which is as of yet 
unobserved.  
However, perhaps over time families may gradually learn about preschool benefits from the 
experiences of their friends, relatives, and neighbors. Therefore, different responsiveness of preschool 
demand to the fee structure may evolve in the long run in a universal preschool program.  
In these simulations with different demand responsiveness, I assume in the case of equal 
distributional benefits for all households that the demand response is half as great as was assumed 
originally. Preschool usage among the upper 40 percent is reduced by 13 percent, compared to 25 percent 
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under the original demand response assumptions. Overall preschool usage and hence costs decline by 6 
percent. Fee revenue is 19 percent of total preschool costs. 
If only disadvantaged children benefit from preschool, I assume that the demand response is 50 
percent greater than was assumed originally. Preschool usage among the upper 40 percent is reduced by 
38 percent, compared to 25 percent originally. Overall preschool usage and costs decline by 19 percent. 
Fee revenue is 22 percent of total preschool costs. 
This assumption that the demand response adapts to the distribution of preschool benefits makes 
an income-based fee system look better. The fee structure in this case allows preschool usage to better 
adapt to the distributional pattern of preschool benefits. 
If all children equally benefit from preschool, and with this adaptive demand responses, a fee 
structure doesn’t reduce overall net benefits as much as with a less adaptive demand response. Overall net 
benefits are reduced from 1.370 percent to 1.276 percent (Table 8B.2, row 11 vs. row 7). With the 
original demand response, they were reduced to 1.192 percent (row 7, Table 8B.1). 
If only disadvantaged children benefit from preschool, and with the adaptive demand response, a 
fee structure increases overall net benefits by more than with a less adaptive demand response. Overall 
net benefits increase from 0.203 percent to 0.232 percent (Table 8B.2, row 22 vs. row 18). With the 
original demand response, overall net benefits only increased to 0.218 percent (row 18, Table 8B.1). 
Overall, however, what is striking is that a fee structure does not dramatically change overall net 
benefits. What it does change is who pays for preschool, although only to a moderate extent. Upper-class 
payments for preschool go up, while the bottom 60 percent of the population pays less. Within the upper 
class, costs of preschool are modestly redistributed from households that don’t use preschool to 
households that do use preschool. It is the political implications of this redistribution of preschool 
financing that are crucial to evaluating the merits of fees.  
 
 Table 8B.1  Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees, Using Alternative Distributional Assumptions 
Income quintile 
Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1  Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
         
  PANEL A: Equal Distributional Assumptions       
 Fees or free? Effects of universal preschool with fees on:       
2 Fees Earnings benefits as % of income 7.030 2.964 2.200 1.227 0.577 1.397 
3  Tax costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.169 0.147 0.162 
4  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.825 2.777 2.022 1.058 0.429 1.234 
5  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 34.25 15.83 12.34 7.25 3.91 8.60 
6  Tax plus fee costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.259 0.190 0.205 
7  Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income 6.825 2.777 2.022 0.967 0.387 1.192 
8  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs 34.25 15.83 12.34 4.73 3.04 6.82 
         
  Effects of universal preschool that is free on:       
9 Free  Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.970 2.203 1.643 0.773 1.593 
10  Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
11  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.765 2.713 1.959 1.411 0.571 1.370 
12  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 11.59 9.03 7.09 3.83 7.16 
         
  PANEL B: Only Disadvantaged Benefit       
  Effects of universal preschool with fees on:       
13 Fees Earnings benefits as % of income 7.030 2.006 0.023 0.013 0.005 0.423 
14  Tax costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.169 0.147 0.162 
15  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.825 1.819 -0.155 -0.156 -0.142 0.261 
16  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 34.25 10.71 0.13 0.08 0.04 2.60 
17  Tax plus fee costs as % of income  0.205 0.187 0.178 0.259 0.190 0.205 
18  Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income 6.825 1.819 -0.155 -0.246 -0.184 0.218 
19  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs 34.25 10.71 0.13 0.05 0.03 2.07 
Table 8B.1  (Continued) 
 
Income quintile 
Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Row #  1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
         
  Effects of universal preschool that is free on:       
20 Free  Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.011 0.025 0.015 0.007 0.425 
21  Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
22  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.765 1.755 -0.219 -0.217 -0.195 0.203 
23  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 7.85 0.10 0.06 0.03 1.91 
NOTE: This table is divided into two panels. Each panel does the same analysis as Table 8.6, but with different distributional assumptions. Both Panel A and Panel 
B assume the same effects on former child participants who are “disadvantaged” (in the lower 35% of household income) as was assumed in Table 8.6. Panel A 
assumes that effects per child participant do not diminish at all as we go from disadvantaged children to non-disadvantaged children. Panel B assumes that there 
are zero efffects on non-disadvantaged children. However, there are still spending effects in each case on all income quintiles. Both Panel A and Panel B assume 
the same reduction in usage due to fees of the top 40% of the income distribution that was assumed by Table 8.6. Within each panel, the format is the same as for 
Table 8.6.  The first set of rows examine the effects of an universal preschool program with income-based fees. These rows analyze net benefits, and ratio of 
benefits to costs, in two ways. One way simply looks at benefits vs. tax costs. The other way includes fees as part of costs. The inclusion of fees is proper from an 
overall social benefits analysis. However, the analysis without fees is more relevant for households who do not use universal preschool.  The second set of rows 
considers the case of universal preschool without any fees. These estimates are taken from Table 8.4, which considers alternative distributional assumptions. The 
fees are set and analyzed as described in the appendix text. The reduced usage induced by fees requires that both tax costs and balanced budget multiplier effects 
be recalculated for all groups. In addition, the earnings benefits of preschool must be recalculated for all groups. I assume reduced usage of preschool due to fees 
is distributed equally across the top two income quintiles. The effects as percentage of income are the present values of the relevant variables as percentages of 
the present value of income. The ratios are ratios of the present values of benefits to the present value of costs.  Present value calculations use 3% discount rate. 
 
 Table 8B.2  Distributional Effects of Universal Preschool with Income-Based Fees, Using Alternative Distributional Assumptions, and with 
Varying Demand Responses 
Income quintile 
Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Row #   1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
1  Quintile % share of total household income 3.4 8.7 14.8 23.4 49.7 100 
         
  PANEL A: Equal Distributional Assumptions       
  Effects of universal preschool with fees on:       
2 Fees Earnings benefits as % of income 6.963 2.945 2.205 1.444 0.679 1.495 
3  Tax costs as % of income  0.223 0.204 0.194 0.184 0.160 0.177 
4  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.739 2.742 2.011 1.259 0.518 1.318 
5  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 31.16 14.45 11.36 7.84 4.23 8.45 
6  Tax plus fee costs as % of income  0.223 0.204 0.194 0.274 0.203 0.219 
7  Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income 6.739 2.742 2.011 1.169 0.476 1.276 
8  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs 31.16 14.45 11.36 5.26 3.35 6.82 
         
  Effects of universal preschool that is free on:       
9 Free  Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.970 2.203 1.643 0.773 1.593 
10  Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
11  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.765 2.713 1.959 1.411 0.571 1.370 
12  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 11.59 9.03 7.09 3.83 7.16 
         
  PANEL B: Only Disadvantaged Benefit       
  Effects of universal preschool with fees on:       
13 Fees Earnings benefits as % of income 7.069 2.010 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.422 
14  Tax costs as % of income  0.187 0.171 0.162 0.154 0.134 0.148 
15  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.882 1.839 -0.152 -0.144 -0.130 0.274 
16  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 37.79 11.78 0.06 0.07 0.03 2.85 
17  Tax plus fee costs as % of income  0.187 0.171 0.162 0.244 0.177 0.190 
18  Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income 6.882 1.839 -0.152 -0.234 -0.172 0.232 
Table 8B.2  (Continued) 
 
Income quintile 
Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Row #   1 2 3 4 5 Overall 
19  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax plus fee costs 37.79 11.78 0.06 0.04 0.03 2.22 
         
  Effects of universal preschool that is free on:       
20 Free  Earnings benefits as % of income 7.046 2.011 0.025 0.015 0.007 0.425 
21  Tax costs as % of income  0.281 0.256 0.244 0.232 0.202 0.222 
22  Net benefits after taxes as % of income 6.765 1.755 -0.219 -0.217 -0.195 0.203 
23  Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs 25.08 7.85 0.10 0.06 0.03 1.91 
NOTE: This table is developed under the same assumptions as Table 8B.1, with one exception. Specifically, this table assumes demand responses that vary with 
the benefits of preschool for upper income quintiles. In this table, if preschool has great benefits for upper income quintiles, then the demand response of upper 
income quintiles to fees will be half as large as assumed for Table 8B.1. But if preschool has no benefits for upper income quintiles, demand responses of upper 
income quintiles to fees will be 50% greater.   
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